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The developing countries of Southeast Asia are rapidly increasing their investments in 
space technologies and formalized national space agencies. The inherent dual-uses and 
broad applications of space technologies as tools of security and development and the 
geopolitical importance of Southeast Asia make this examination of small-state space 
programs useful in exploring a number of themes.   
This thesis seeks to determine the conditions under which ASEAN member states 
choose to pursue space programs as vehicles for cooperation and competition with each 
other and developed international space powers within the context of international 
relations theory. It analyzes Southeast Asian national space developments to date, the 
relationship between domestic and foreign policies in influencing national space policies 
and extra-regional cooperation, the extent of regional space cooperation within ASEAN, 
and the role of bureaucratic and epistemic space communities in fostering an ASEAN 
community.   
The thesis concludes that cooperative and competitive forces complement each 
other as they operate at various levels within a multi-scalar international network. 
Patterns of space cooperation and competition among Southeast Asian space programs 
balance these two activities, as well as regional centrifugal and centripetal forces, in a 
relatively peaceful, positive sum game for national and regional space development. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The countries of Southeast Asia have increased their acquisitions of a number of 
space technologies, with the amount and sophistication of investment growing such that 
nearly every nation in the region now participates in space activities. Given the 
distinctive physics of the orbital environment, inherent dual-use applications, and 
substantial expense, space systems are at a unique crossroads of opportunity for 
cooperation and competition. This thesis seeks to identify and explain patterns of 
international cooperation and competition among Southeast Asian space programs: What 
are the conditions under which Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
member states invest in space programs to compete or cooperate with each other and 
other international space powers? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
These relationships among regional space programs lay at a junction of themes, 
including a changing world order, a frontier of persistently disruptive technological 
applications, and the decision-making processes within and between states in one of the 
world’s most rapidly changing regions, with implications for U.S. regional and global 
policy. Firstly, the increase in nations accessing space reflects a 21st century shift to a 
multipolar world, as previous monopolies on power are diminished.1 Robert Harding 
makes the case that “since the end of the Cold War, the gap between ambitions, 
achievements, and relative power of developed and developing states has begun to 
narrow,” including in such important areas as “economic performance and influence in 
the international system.”2 The declining costs of orbital access have resulted in a much 
more crowded field of national space actors, as a multitude of developing nations have 
                                                 
1 Rather than belabor that point here, see:  Thomas L. Friedman, The World Is Flat:  A Brief History of the 
Twenty-First Century (New York:  Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005); Moisés Naím, The End of Power:  From 
Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used to Be (New York:  Basic 
Books, 2013); Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008). 
2 Robert C. Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries:  The Search for Security and Development on the 
Final Frontier (London:  Routledge, 2013), 72. 
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increased their space activities over the last few decades.3 These reduced barriers to entry 
indicate that space access is transitioning from the costly “ascent” phase of spaceflight’s 
first half century, in which a few powers demonstrated the technology, into a “diffusion” 
phase, marked by greater technological maturity and market penetration through 
widespread acceptance of the benefits.4 Thus, democratized entry into space by a quorum 
of ASEAN’s member states suggests a second space age with distinctly different levels of 
participation and political, economic, and social effects both on earth and on orbit. 
Therefore, this thesis offers insight into the behavior of the growing number of nations 
that aspire to greater roles in space. 
Secondly, space lies at a unique confluence of technology, politics, and 
economics; though isolatable as a single issue, its relevance spans a wide range of human 
activities, including navigation, military modernization, communications, commerce, 
domain awareness, national prestige (both domestic and international), and a variety of 
other applications. It is therefore a useful prism through which to study a range of 
variables in national strategies and international relations. Space still presents high 
relative costs to developing nations, so understanding “the political, economic, and 
cultural rationales” by which developing nations pursue space programs as an 
increasingly “integral component of their national policies” offers revealing insight 
toward internal and external national decision-making calculi.5 This thesis fills a current 
gap in knowledge regarding space policies within the regional subset of nations 
representing Southeast Asia. 
Thirdly, space’s perceptual transition from “ultimate high ground” to “final 
frontier” to “crowded” commons increases its relevance as both a source of problems and 
opportunity in international cooperation.6 Southeast Asia is one of the world’s most 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 2. 
4 Everett Rogers’ cycle of diffusion of innovations suggests that the innovators and early majority are now being 
joined by a late majority near the top of the bell curve of adoption.  James Fleck, “Learning by Trying:  The 
Implementation of Configurational Technology,” in The Social Shaping of Technology, 2nd ed., eds.  Donald 
MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (Philadelphia:  Open University Press, 1999), 28.   
5 Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries., ix and 2. 
6 See:  James Clay Moltz, Crowded Orbits:  Conflict and Cooperation in Space (New York:  Columbia University 
Press, 2014).  
 3 
dynamic regions:  with a population of 600 million, a combined economy among the 
world’s top ten (both growing rapidly), modernizing militaries, a fluid regional security 
situation, and an ambitious regionalization agenda, Southeast Asia represents more than 
merely a crossroads of geography, markets, and great power spheres of influence.7 
Because space overlaps so many functional areas, it provides a useful reference point to 
determine Southeast Asia’s changing place within the world system. Southeast Asia’s 
emerging space programs function, therefore, as a windsock, indicating both the 
prevailing direction and intensity of the winds of change in the regional geopolitical, 
technological, and socioeconomic order.   
Understanding this shifting geopolitical—and orbital—landscape is relevant if the 
United States seeks to stay ahead of such changes as the predominant status quo power. 
Therefore, while the United States often preoccupies itself with scrutinizing the biggest 
emerging space powers, protecting its technological lead to the detriment of space 
cooperation, or chasing grand strategies of “space control” or “space dominance,” it risks 
limiting its field of view such that it misses the expanding galaxy by zeroing in on the 
brightest stars. To appreciate the relevance of this new “silent majority” of space actors, 
closer examination of their space programs’ roles as vehicles for cooperation or 
competition is warranted. By analyzing existing patterns of cooperation among Southeast 
Asian space programs, this thesis explains fundamental conditions under which those 
countries choose to cooperate (or not to cooperate) through either ASEAN, other 
international institutions, or bilateral arrangements. Understanding how and why 
Southeast Asian nations reconcile their national interests in space today reveals insights 
into tomorrow’s geopolitical frontier. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES  
Two problems addressed by this thesis are ASEAN’s potential for achieving its 
rhetorical goals of regional community-building despite potentially conflicting national 
space strategies and tensions between dueling perceptions and applications of space 
technology. While the arc of longue durée may indicate increasing integration within the 
                                                 
7 “ASEAN Statistics,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, accessed August 21, 2014, www.asean.org. 
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Southeast Asian community, significant hurdles remain toward achieving greater 
practical cooperation (particularly within high-tech industries), including recidivist 
nationalist protectionism, developmental and financial constraints, and shortfalls of 
technical capacity. ASEAN’s consensus-based model of decision-making—part of the 
“ASEAN Way” much heralded prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis and now 
somewhat muted by intervening events—may impede practical cooperation on 
transnational issues despite the ambitious agenda for regionalization. ASEAN’s three-
pillared community-building agenda, including full implementation by 2015 of an 
ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), 
and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), has been limited to date by a spotty 
track record of cooperation on transnational issues. Greater regional cooperation within 
science and technology academies and bureaucracies through multi-faceted space 
applications could offer an appealing avenue for greater cooperation. 
Another problem is born of viewer perspective—whether one sees space as a 
forum for techno-national competition or a cooperative commons. The historic dual-use 
tug-of-war between civil and military uses of space is certainly affected by inserting into 
the system a large volume of users with strongly developmental agendas in space, as a 
majority of space stakeholders with explicit declarations for exclusively peaceful uses of 
outer space could decisively tip the balance in international discourse. Furthermore, for 
developing countries in particular, space may be uniquely conducive to cooperation due 
to the high costs of entry and technical hurdles, but it is also prone to perceptions of 
“space race” competition along the classic realist vein of a security dilemma. Unlike the 
larger Asia-Pacific region, Southeast Asia’s ASEAN-altered security paradigm and 
consensus-based model may have uniquely mitigated much of the race aspect within the 
region. Yet, cooperation is somewhat limited due to technical considerations that 
encourage collaboration with external space powers and competing national objectives 
that limit perceived benefits from regional cooperation; it may remain limited if space’s 
dual-use nature creates structural pull toward future militarization. The role of these 
external alignments within regional politics is itself an interesting problem, given certain 
views of “Southeast Asian security [as] mostly a function of major power policies and 
 5 
preferences:  less a function of ASEAN [and more] a product of coincident great power 
interests.”8 
Several hypotheses grow out of these initial conditions:   
(1) Terrestrial politics are likely to shape the dynamics of the orbital landscape. 
Realist theories suggest that within an interdependent economic paradigm dominated by 
large power blocs, nations with smaller resource bases frequently make the rational 
decision to cooperate with each other in order to compete with larger powers, resulting in 
a multi-scalar international system as space access democratizes. Such realities could 
significantly affect ASEAN integration, as space nationalism could succumb to 
cooperative expediency as Southeast Asian nations are induced to externally balance 
collectively against extra-regional actors. Or, divergent extra-regional alignments and 
persistent mutual insecurities could preempt greater regional cooperation, as states pursue 
independent, national space policies to internally balance against not only great powers 
but also each other. 
(2)  Technological deterministic theories may presume that the physical realities 
of the orbital environment require either cooperative or competitive statecraft over its 
alternative. But this binary opposition in perspectives of space as a cooperative or 
competitive environment may be too simplistic in assessing patterns of national 
interaction in that medium. More likely, technological determinants are influenced by 
their social construction. Such considerations further imply that the space technologies of 
Southeast Asian countries, even if primarily developmental in application, cannot be 
viewed as purely economic apparatuses; because of fundamental dual-use utility and 
national perceptions of space investments as economic multipliers, space pursuits within 
Southeast Asia must be viewed comprehensively along a broad spectrum encompassing 
both development and security. 
(3) Experience indicates that cooperation at the sub-regional bilateral and multi-
lateral levels has often been the “avenue of choice among ASEAN countries” and a 
                                                 
8 Alice Ba, “The Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” in The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies, 
ed. Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell, and Joseph Chinyong Liow (London:  Routledge, 2010), 210. 
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precursor to expanded cooperation, especially regarding more wicked problems.9 Based 
on liberal theories of gradually thickening patterns of interdependence, Southeast Asian 
space cooperation may initially continue to be dominated by coordination with larger, 
external spacefaring states due to issues of technical capacity, then move into a period in 
which interested and more technically advanced regional leaders cooperate in issue-
specific breakout groups, before eventually becoming commonplace with potential 
formalization at the regional institutional level. 
(4) If similar space and technology bureaucracies cooperate positively with each 
other across national boundaries, constructivist theories suggest that an epistemic 
community could be a driver for broader Southeast Asian cooperation. While rhetoric 
could continue to outpace measurable progress, a thickening web of norm acculturation 
and a positive feedback cycle among all three pillars of the ASEAN Community would 
continue to propel the slow march toward greater integration within the ASEAN 
Community. Organizational international cooperation in space science and technology 
offers unique benchmarks by which to measure regional cooperative patterns. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Given the position of this thesis’ subject matter at the interstices between space 
policies and motivations and Southeast Asian regionalism, there is a large and growing 
library relevant to this study. Consolidating the existing scholarship to provide a platform 
from which to launch into the unknown requires background information in several 
critical areas:  describing Southeast Asian space efforts and plans to date; exploring how 
realist, liberal, and constructivist theories offer various perspectives on space 
cooperation; and building a context of current regional cooperation within ASEAN. 
1. Defining Southeast Asian Space Programs 
Space pursuits of developing countries, which by definition are more resource-
constrained than larger spacefaring leaders, present an interesting guns-versus-butter 
argument with regard to state policy choice. Though not focused on any particular region, 
                                                 
9 Narayanan Ganesan, “Bilateral Tensions in ASEAN,” in The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies, ed. 
Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell, and Joseph Chinyong Liow (London:  Routledge, 2010), 210. 
 7 
on the matter of Space Policy in Developing Countries Robert Harding concludes that the 
“pursuit of space-related endeavors is part of a logical progression in a state’s assurance 
of its national security and economic development.”10 He divides “emerging space actors 
(EMSAs)” into three tiers based on level of investment and sophistication of indigenous 
capability. By his metric, all of Southeast Asia’s EMSAs join the third tier of “smaller, 
but no less enthusiastic states [that] now make up the majority of the world’s space 
actors.”11 Danielle Wood and Annalisa Weigel offer an alternative tiered approach to 
categorization, the “space ladder,” which establishes milestones against which to measure 
space programs’ comparative capabilities.12 
Because “both opportunity cost and comparative advantage drive political and 
strategic decisions in space,” there is considerable consensus that the “developmental 
trajectory” followed by new entrants to space tracks that of the first generation of space 
actors.13 If strategy is understood as a process of identifying a political objective then 
matching national “instruments of power” (the means) to such ends, the establishment of 
space agencies to act on behalf of a nation indicates conscious strategic formulation.14 
Therefore, expenditures of scarce national resources in space represent the conclusion of 
a rational calculus that determines space to be valuable for either:  prestige (the price of 
admission for a seat at the 21st century table); economic development (a net positive 
cost-benefit venture); national security (as a capacity multiplier); or, more often, all three. 
Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, the 
Philippines, and even Laos participate in space activities and possess some form of 
government space bureaucracy to coordinate space policies. The region has no natural 
leader in space; while some countries specialize in comparative advantages, they each 
                                                 
10 Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 13. 
11 Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 14, 78–79. 
12 Danielle Wood and Annalisa Weigel, “Charting the evolution of satellite programs in developing countries—
The Space Technology Ladder,” Space Policy 28, no. 1 (February 2012), 15, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2011.11.001. 
13 Eligar Sadeh, “Introduction:  Towards Space Strategy,” in Eligar Sadeh, ed., Space Strategy in the 21st 
Century:  Theory and Policy (London:  Routledge, 2013), 7; Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 74. 
14 “Lesson 1:  Strategy,” National and International Security Studies (8902), Marine Corps Command and Staff 
College Distance Education Program (Quantico, VA:  Marine Corps University, AY-13), 1-1. 
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seek to broaden their independent capabilities to reduce reliance on regional and foreign 
providers. Though a Vietnamese cosmonaut and a Malaysian angkasawan have flown in 
space to raise national prestige, overall, the developmental focus of Southeast Asian 
nations in space drives competition primarily into the economic realm; therefore, the 
space security dimension within Southeast Asian programs—while present—operates at a 
more nuanced level than it does among the larger global space powers. The region’s 
gathering momentum in space in the last few decades is demonstrated by a number of 
metrics: expansion of the number of nations operating in space since 1990 and their 
collaboration on projects with larger space powers; the proliferation of formalized 
government space agencies since 2000 (adding Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and Laos, 
with the Philippines a future possibility); and future ambitions backed by significant 
investment increases (such as a Indonesia’s substantial space budget increase since 2000 
and Vietnam’s construction of a large satellite control center).15 
Complicating regional cooperation in space is the inseparable competitive aspect. 
Only Indonesia within Southeast Asia has demonstrated serious interest in building the 
sort of independent launch capability historically associated with missile technology, and 
regional programs have focused predominantly on telecommunications, Earth 
observation, and remote sensing; however, other irrevocably dual-use space applications 
ensure cooperation will always be countered by equal and opposite apprehensions of 
competition in a sort of Newton’s third law of international space interactions. For 
example, while a reconnaissance satellite may not constitute a “threat,” such national 
capabilities inevitably provoke sentiments of asymmetric disadvantage among those 
lacking similar organic capabilities. 
2. International Relations Theories on Orbit 
The more things change, the more they stay the same; because space technologies 
are designed and implemented by people, traditional international relations theories retain 
some relevance when lifted into the extraterrestrial environment. Though geopolitical 
                                                 
15 James Clay Moltz, Asia’s Space Race:  National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International Risks 
(New York:  Columbia University Press, 2012), Kindle edition. 
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concepts such as sovereignty are increasingly in flux given the highly-networked 
transnational challenges of the 21st century, traditional realist, structural, liberal, and 
constructivist models of international relations theory each provide some insight into the 
calculus of Southeast Asian strategies in space.16 One can thus leverage a body of work 
dedicated to understanding patterns of cooperation and competition by more established 
space powers. James Clay Moltz offers a helpful catalogue that places these theories into 
space-based context:  (1) space nationalism, rooted in classical realism, (2) technological 
determinism, discussed here in a context of structural realism, (3) global institutionalism, 
based in liberal perspectives of international interdependence, and (4) social 
interactionism, encapsulating a constructivist bent on space relations.17 
a. Space Nationalism 
Given views of space’s utility as a military or economic multiplier (or both), 
perceptions of power provide a critical lens through which to view a state’s place and 
trajectory within a specific international context. Harding notes that “states have 
traditionally structured national space policy in ways that are not at all unlike their 
terrestrial national security and developmental priorities—that, in a Hobbesian world of 
competitive states, space power serves to ensure not only the survival of the state but its 
prosperity.”18 Everett Carl Dolman’s realism views even “ostensibly cooperative” space 
projects as façades for advancement of “political, strategic, and economic goals of the 
individual state;” promoting “‘international cooperation’ for the ‘good of all mankind’” is 
merely a Trojan horse.19 Southeast Asia’s more developmentally oriented space 
programs, then, “fit squarely within the realist realm of competitive self-interest, even as 
                                                 
16 To completely disregard traditional international relations theories built upon the body of experience 
constituted by known human history smacks of extreme “chronocentricity—the egotism that one’s own generation is 
poised on the very cusp of history.”  Tom Standage, The Victorian Internet:  The Remarkable Story of the Telegraph 
and the Nineteenth Century’s On-line Pioneers (New York:  Berkeley Books, 1998), 213. 
17 Though derived from international relations theories, Moltz focuses on policy choices driven by their various 
applications.  This thesis focuses more on the explanatory power of these theoretical frameworks.  James Clay Moltz, 
The Politics of Space Security:  Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests, 2nd ed. (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2011), Kindle edition, 23. 
18 Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 13. 
19 Ibid., 17. 
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the justifications for a state’s space policy escape the orbit of classical hard power.”20  
Even such realist mutual suspicion does not reach far enough for Dolman, whose 
astropolitik embeds military strategy into a state-centric space regime, accepting 
militarization as an inevitable means to a realist end.21 A “world of modern territorial 
nation-states” will project its security dilemma into space at every level (even within 
cooperative regions), preventing “those political entities from cooperatively exploiting 
the realm”; efforts at cooperation will inadvertently provoke “countervailing results.”22 
Because space is an “environment of relative scarcity…conflict can be expected”23 so 
assuredly that even Southeast Asia’s relatively modest space programs should be tailored 
to brace their nations as tools of “cross-domain deterrence.”24 
Neorealism offers multiple insights relevant to cooperative patterns among 
Southeast Asia’s space programs, ranging from structural constraints that impel actors 
into space then guide their actions through technological determinism. Contrasting 
predominantly peaceful programs such as the European Space Agency (ESA) or 
Southeast Asia’s national programs with early American, Soviet, or Chinese efforts, 
neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz would argue that though space programs may originate 
from different focal origins, the realities of dual-purpose applications and structural 
influences of the international system “oblige states to [grow] functionally alike,” so that 
the full spectrum application of space systems ultimately converges, “constrained only by 
the comparative resources available to them.”25 Steven Lambakis emphasizes the role of 
technology transfer in bending commercial, scientific, and civil space projects toward 
military applications.26 If Southeast Asia’s national programs are viewed from this 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 146. 
21 Dolman, Astropolitik, 183. 
22 Ibid., 3. 
23 Everett Carl Dolman, “New Frontiers, Old Realities,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 6, no. 1 (2012), 80. 
24 James A. Lewis, “Reconsidering Deterrence for Space and Cyberspace,” in Michael Krepon and Julia 
Thompson, eds., Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations (Washington, DC: Stimson 
Center, September 2013), 67. 
25 Michael Sheehan, The International Politics of Space (London:  Routledge, 2007), 11. 
26 Steven Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth:  The Future of American Space Power (Lexington, KY:  University 
Press of Kentucky, 2001), 48. 
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perspective—assuming greater eventual militarization (such as increased security-minded 
use of surveillance or domain awareness)—then incentives to cooperate regionally are 
wholly dependent on regional interpretations of the security dilemma.   
b. Technological Determinism 
The influence of dual-use technology in shaping the international system is highly 
dependent on the degree of agency vested in technology. “Hard” technological 
determinism imputes technological systems with substantial power to effect change or 
limit freedom of action for human actors; its “soft” alternative views technological 
applications as a “history of human actions” woven together with a variety of agents in a 
complex tapestry.27 Because technological devices interact with human users as part of a 
system,28 the “technique” by which rockets, satellites, and other accoutrements of space 
access are integrated into society constructs the world they are used in29 while they in 
turn are “designed, consciously or unconsciously, to open certain social options and close 
others.”30 For example, the evolution of rocketry and orbital reconnaissance in an era of 
hot and cold conflict dictated many of the directions space programs took. The resultant 
applications in turn shaped the world order, influencing negotiations on arms control 
regimes by permitting new levels of compliance verification. Thus, depending upon one’s 
vantage point, space cooperation is likely to either have effects on international relations 
as an important avenue for cooperation, be entirely shaped by the nature of regional 
cooperation itself, or lie somewhere in the middle. 
Peter Perdue argues that “technology constrains…it does not determine,” which 
reflects a middle-path perspective regarding agency and technique.31 Technology’s role 
                                                 
27 Leo Marx and Merritt Roe Smith, “Introduction,” in Does Technology Drive History:  The Dilemma of 
Technological Determinism, ed. Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 1994), xii. 
28 Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, eds., The Social Shaping of Technology, 2nd ed.  (Philadelphia:  Open 
University Press, 1999), 10. 
29 Ibid., 10. 
30 MacKenzie and Wajcman, Social Shaping of Technology, 4. 
31 Peter C. Perdue, “Technological Determinism in Agrarian Societies,” in Does Technology Drive History:  The 
Dilemma of Technological Determinism, ed. Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 
1994), 169. 
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outside of “physical calculations and material constraints” is particularly pertinent to a 
study of Southeast Asian space programs, given a unique marriage in the region between 
advanced technology and state aspirations. Sulfikar Amir’s study of technology’s role in 
coloring Indonesian authoritarianism dubs the unique developmental model a 
“technological state.”32 Sulfikar’s “techno-national” complex recalls the concept of 
power:   
Technology and politics are mutually reinforcing in the production of 
power; on one hand, the material configurations of technology have 
political effects and are effective in use for political purposes. On the other 
hand, the shaping of technology is greatly influenced by the context of 
power relations which operate in the space where technology exists.33 
Technology’s relationship to power politics is developed by Joan Johnson-Freese 
specifically in Space as a Strategic Asset, where she argues that “especially in today’s 
globalized environment, technology advancements can be viewed to indicate national 
stature and, potentially, power; techno-nationalism—using technology to build stature 
and power perceptions—is a useful and valid geopolitical consideration.”34 Particularly 
since the end of the Cold War, national perceptions of security have evolved to “embrace 
social, environmental, and economic dimensions.”35 Concepts of state power expanded in 
scope, particularly with the popularization of “soft” power and “whole of government” 
approaches.36 Socioeconomic development moved from primarily a source of domestic 
legitimacy toward a prime factor of “deep security”37 against existential threats, with 
increased emphasis on sustainable innovation-driven endogenous models of economic 
                                                 
32 Sulfikar Amir, The Technological State in Indonesia:  The Co-Constitution of High Technology and 
Authoritarian Politics (London:  Routledge, 2013), 160. 
33 Sulfikar, Technological State, 160. 
34 Joan Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New York:  Columbia University Press, 2007), 11. 
35 Sheehan, Politics of Space, 1. 
36 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Perseus Books Group, 
2004). 
 
37 The concept of deep security seeks to integrate “revolutionary forces,” including technology, that act on the 
international environment with the “demands and responsibilities that…established power” requires; see:  Joshua 
Cooper Ramo, The Age of the Unthinkable:  Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us and What to Do 
About It (New York:  Hatchette Book Group, 2009), Kindle edition, loc. 238. 
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growth.38 For Harding’s lower-tier EMSAs, the “application of space-based assets still 
addresses the issue of national security, just from a less narrow scope than that employed 
during the earlier realist approach to the space race.”39   
Within the emerging economies of Southeast Asia, advanced technology, of 
which space exploitation is a flagship enterprise, is increasingly viewed as “an open-
ended source of economic growth and cultural integration,” that can serve to tie the 
region together so that it can better compete in a world dominated by greater powers.40  
With particular relevance to ASEAN, Michael Sheehan notes that “in the contemporary 
international system the development of advanced technology has now become the key 
system variable in the way that military power and alliance membership previously was, 
and geo-technological maneuvering has replaced geopolitical rivalry in the global 
competition for status and political influence.”41 Realists may be reassured, however, that 
today’s predominantly “scientific and economic cooperation,” of which Southeast Asia’s 
space entry is an important dimension, is still “coupled with a military reality.”42 
c. Global Institutionalism 
Historically, because the major spacefaring nations have possessed an “abundance 
of technological, scientific, financial, and political capability,” theories of competition 
offered sufficient explanation for many; however, today’s lower threshold for space entry 
has carried to orbit more development-centric agendas, requiring a “contrasting emphasis 
on cooperation” offered by liberal theories of global institutionalism.43 By the 1990s, 
when the “flow economy” of trade, capital, and intellectual property began to dwarf the 
“territorial economy,” Southeast Asian nations sought better ways to link themselves into 
                                                 
38   Michel E. Porter, “Enhancing the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity:  The Current Competitiveness 
Index,” The Global Competitiveness Report 2002 (2001), 2. 
39 Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 196. 
40 Michael L. Smith, “Recourse of Empire:  Landscapes of Progress in Technological America,” in Does 
Technology Drive History:  The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, ed. Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx 
(Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 1994), 37. 
41 Sheehan, Politics of Space, 9. 
42 Ibid., 13. 
43 Sheehan, Politics of Space, 10. 
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global supply chains.44 Accordingly, “liberals have emphasized the increasing irrelevance 
of national borders to the conduct and organization of economic activity,” particularly 
relevant over a half century after Sputnik’s global overflight forever altered perceptions 
of national boundaries.45  In an interdependent world, mutual restraint and stakeholding 
gain at the expense of an anarchic world of self-serving nation-states. 
Incentivizing accession to treaties governing behavior in space and to bodies such 
as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to de-conflict orbital slots, space 
exploitation is often considered an inherently “federative” activity—of particular 
relevance to the community-building agenda of ASEAN.46 Nancy Gallagher assumes 
activities within the space environment are interdependent by nature, with parallel 
incentive to cooperate alongside competition.47 Furthermore, as states shrink worldwide, 
constraints on national budgets and pools of technical skill further incentivize 
cooperation on expensive space activities—one reason Southeast Asian nations are forced 
to collaborate with larger space powers and each other to meet shared goals.48  Finally, 
theories of functionalist cooperation originating from European Union (EU) and ESA 
examples and frequently applied to ASEAN hypothesize that transnational institutions 
can grow through iterative repetition to displace national competition and national 
loyalties.49 Within functionalism, scientific and technical cooperation is viewed as a 
vanguard cooperative effort due to perceptions of its political innocuousness.50    
                                                 
44 Chia Lin Sien, Southeast Asia Transformed:  A Geography of Change (Singapore:  Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2003), 267-8. 
45 Sheehan, Politics of Space, 16. 
46 Marietta Benko and Kai-Uwe Schrogl, “Space Benefits:  Towards a Useful Framework for International 
Cooperation,” Space Policy 11 (1995), quoted in Michael Sheehan, The International Politics of Space (London:  
Routledge, 2007), 13. 
47 Cited in Sadeh, “Towards Space Strategy,” 5. 
48 On the shrinking state, see:  Naím, End of Power, 76-81. 
49 Sheehan, Politics of Space, 72. 
50 Ibid., 72-73. 
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d. Social Interactionism 
In the example of EU and ESA integration, a new order of frequent interactions 
under a long shadow of the future played a role that is often transposed onto the ASEAN 
template, as is the critical role played by an “epistemic community” of scientists “who 
were able to influence national interpretations of state interests, and increase the 
likelihood of convergence in state behavior at the international level.”51 Such social 
interactionist and bureaucratic-organizational theories offer potential insight into the 
Southeast Asian experiences with regional integration and space cooperation. While 
opposing national policy logics can hinder cooperation, there are countervailing forces 
beneath the national level that can oppose such dilemmas. Both space nationalist Dolman 
and institutionalist Sheehan concede to some degree that competition in space is largely 
what states make of it.52 As orbits crowd, to avoid spillover effects and harmful 
interference it will become increasingly necessary for an ever-larger number of space 
stakeholders to establish norms that ensure uninterrupted access to their substantial 
orbital investments53; indeed, the iterative processes of norm acculturation in space and 
ASEAN are each a half century old. 
The process of furthering national space strategies has resulted in the formation of 
similar national space bureaucracies throughout Southeast Asia. Ernst Haas’ work on the 
three models of “adaptation” or “learning” by international organizations regarding their 
evolving mission orientations offers a method to analyze ASEAN’s organizational 
development as a node within a growing web of national and regional bureaucracies.54 
Similarly, Haas’s examination of “international science and technology programs 
                                                 
51 Sheehan, Politics of Space, 73. 
52 Dolman notes in the context of his astropolitik that “benevolence or malevolence will become apparent only as 
it is applied, and by whom,” in:  Dolman, Astropolitik, 4; Sheehan notes that “what we perceive space to be shapes our 
views of how it should be exploited,” in: Sheehan, Politics of Space, 5. 
53 Chia-Jui Cheng and Doo Hwan Kim, eds., The Utilization of the World’s Air Space and Free Outer Space in 
the 21st Century:  Proceedings of the International Conference on Air and Space Policy, Law and Industry for the 21st 
Century held in Seoul from 23-25 June 1997 (The Hague:  Kluwer Law International, 2000), 377. 
54 The three models are adaptive “incremental growth” or “turbulent nongrowth” and learning through “managed 
interdependence.”  Haas viewed ASEAN in its first decade as one of only two organizations to “display evidence of 
learning.”  See:  Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge is Power:  Three Models of Change in International Organizations 
(Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1990), 4 and 159. 
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[becoming] more comprehensive and more ambitious in linking specialized knowledge to 
expanding economic, social, and political goals” offers additional insight into the unique 
role technical bureaucracies can play in national and international politics as “scientific 
culture has become coterminous with political life.”55 It is possible technocratic 
organizations have a special claim in political imaginations that “empower[s] them to 
prescribe major changes” in a complex world.56 If similar national bureaucratic agencies 
such as scientific communities interact positively with each other and their societies, 
especially under facilitative umbrella organizations such as the Subcommittee on Space 
Technology and Applications (SCOSA) within ASEAN’s Committee on Science and 
Technology (COST), it is possible a more powerful regional epistemic community could 
emerge. Bureaucratic self-interest can act with significant agency in determining national 
perspectives and agendas, particularly if similar bureaucracies are more prone to 
cooperate with each other irrespective of national borders. Within the nascent ASEAN 
Community, bureaucratic and economic elites are often among the largest stakeholders in 
an expanded regional identity; thus, the community of scientists and academics with 
vested interests in expanding their functional scope and organizational budgets though 
international cooperation are likely to be active “norm entrepreneurs” of the 
regionalization process.57 On the other hand, these cosmopolitan bureaucracies must 
compete against other bureaucracies with more primordialist inclinations; within 
Southeast Asia, state militaries and other nationalistic bureaucracies retain substantial 
influence and tend to counteract such internationalist trends.  
3. Contextualizing Southeast Asian Cooperation and Competition to Date 
So what of these theories where they coincide with ASEAN regionalism through 
the lens of space cooperation? Southeast Asia’s culture of non-interference and tradition 
of ideas such as a regional Zone of Freedom, Peace, and Neutrality and a Nuclear 
                                                 
55 Ernst B. Haas, Mary Pat Williams, and Don Babai, Scientists and World Order:  The Uses of Technical 
Knowledge in International Organizations (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1977), 355. 
56 Haas et al, Scientists and World Order, 4. 
57 Max M. Mutschler and Christophe Venet, “The European Union as an Emerging Actor in Space Security?” 
Space Policy 28 (2012), 123, doi:10.1016fj.spacepol.2012.02.005.  
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Weapons Free Zone are prone to support establishment of a “space sanctuary” to assure 
unmitigated access.58 While the regional orientation suggests common positions in 
international dialogue on space policy, patterns of collaboration on space projects can 
also indicate progress toward increased regional institutionalism, toward which liberal 
theories offer insight. 
ASEAN’s founding in 1967 by five non-communist nations implies a security 
dimension in the forum’s origin, though ASEAN now also includes the region’s 
communist states. Despite the APSC goal and continuing regional security dialogues, 
economic cooperation (to balance other large economic blocs) has been one of its most 
quantifiable successes. Despite recent emphasis on this interdependence, Alice Ba holds 
that ASEAN is still “best characterized as a political-security organization” in which 
economic cooperation plays only a supporting role.59 Barry Buzan applies the term 
“security complex” to similarly emphasize that Southeast Asia’s “national securities 
cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.”60 Alan Collins notes that 
internal threats and external interference in Southeast Asia could only be countered by 
concerted action, requiring ASEAN to adopt a policy of “regional resilience” 
encompassing all aspects of state- and region-building.61 Hence, the interest in multi-
dimensional space-based development projects mirrors the three-pillared nature of the 
2015 ASEAN Community agenda formalized by the long-awaited 2007 ASEAN Charter. 
Science and technology cooperation offers a venue for both national and regional 
development agendas, with direct applications toward regional transnational problems 
such as maritime domain awareness and environmental monitoring. These insights into 
Southeast Asian behavior hit on a junction between both liberal theories of cooperation 
and realist theories of competition—while states may compete with each other across a 
                                                 
58 Bruce DeBlois, “Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy,” Aerospace Power Journal (Winter 1998), 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.html.  
59 Ba, “Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” 205. 
60 Cited in:  Alan Collins, The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia (Singapore:  Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2000), 109. 
61 Collins notes that the concept is borrowed from Suharto’s “national resilience…emerging from the strength of 
national development… [covering] all aspects of nation-building—ideological, political, economic, social, cultural….”  
See:  Collins, Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia, 111. 
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broad spectrum they may also cooperate to some degree in order to competitively balance 
larger extra-regional actors to preserve their postcolonial autonomy. 
While the non-interference and consensus-based model was appealing and 
facilitated regional expansion (ASEAN encompassed all Southeast Asian states except 
Timor Leste by 1999), Jürgen Rüland and Anja Jetschke note that ASEAN’s “marked 
success in pacifying an erstwhile turbulent region” has not been matched by its 
“ambiguous record in responding to the challenges associated with globalization,” 
suggesting that practical cooperation in developmental space policies may be limited.62  
Their concern that “implementation lags…rhetoric” is a common sentiment in academic 
and policy circles63; Jones and Smith criticize ASEAN for “making process, not 
progress,”64 while Ravichandran Moorthy and Guido Benny note the ambitious 
timeframe for implementation of the ASEAN Community compared to other similar 
organizations, particularly given the lack of regional identity or involvement by most of 
the region’s 600 million people.65  Constructivist theories of social interactionism offer a 
lens through which to better examine the role of similar national space bureaucracies (and 
the epistemic communities they may represent) in affecting patterns of cooperation and 
competition among states. 
Also pessimistic are those such as Richard Bitzinger, who regard the rapid rise in 
regional military spending in 21st century Southeast Asia as an indication of a negative 
“arms dynamic.”66  National space investments encourage such perceptions, which would 
diminish incentives to cooperate on development of such capabilities. Hari Singh’s 2000 
                                                 
62 Jürgen Rüland and Anja Jetschke, “40 Years of ASEAN:  Perspectives, Performance, and Lessons for Change,” 
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Asian Regional Order,” International Security 32, no. 1 (Summer 2007), 149. 
65 Ravichandran Moorthy and Guido Benny, “Is an ‘ASEAN Community’ Achievable?  A Public Perception 
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assertion that “states within ASEAN are potential adversaries despite pretensions of 
being a ‘security community’”67 would cite defense expenditure increases since then as 
further evidence of a persistent security dilemma in the region.68 Thus, all the 
aforementioned shifting valuations of power and deep security have not altered a 
fundamental security dilemma, but merely widened its arena and broadened the context; 
in such conceptions, space-based intelligence—whether providing advantages in harvest 
efficiency, resistance to natural disasters, or monitoring adversary capabilities—proves 
more than ever that knowledge is power.69 Again, the dual-use dilemma rises to the 
surface; the degree to which technological deterministic views and structural realist 
theoretical perspectives explain or drive behavior influences how patterns of state 
cooperation and competition in space can be viewed. 
In a 2008 Ph.D. dissertation, Chukeat Noichim cites SCOSA’s limitations in 
furthering regionalization, arguing that a formal “ASEAN Space Organization” would 
offer better practical progress toward all three pillars of the ASEAN Community as a 
“focal point for broader international cooperation.”70 Referencing precedents such as 
ESA, he thoroughly examines legal and feasibility issues of the prospect; yet, little 
discussion has followed. SCOSA remains a small shop, and several member states still 
lack even formal national space agencies. Moltz’s broader survey of Asian space 
programs identifies a “missing middle” of cooperation among the continent’s largest 
regional space actors71; despite substantial cooperation between Southeast Asian nations 
and external space powers for obvious reasons of capacity, the concern that “expanded 
                                                 
67 Hari Singh, “Vietnam and ASEAN:  The Politics of Accommodation,” Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 51, no. 2 (1997) quoted in Alan Collins, The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia (Singapore:  Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 89. 
68 Collins, Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia, 92-103. 
69 In this context, space-derived “intelligence” itself can be placed on a spectrum from basic remote 
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sophisticated satellites operated by the advanced space powers.  
70 Chukeat Noichim, “The ASEAN Space Organization:  Legal Aspects and Feasibility” (PhD diss., Leiden 
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[Asian] regional space cooperation is an unlikely near-term outcome” may be similarly 
translated to the Southeast Asian sub-region as well.72 
A final consideration guiding Southeast Asia’s cooperative space activities is this 
reliance on external powers to provide technical and financial support for its national 
space-based activities. Great power competition for influence in the region could hinder 
regionalization by supporting opposing alignments, but changing regional threat 
perceptions could also provoke cooperative balancing responses.73  Joey Long uses a lens 
of great power politics to explore the important position of Southeast Asia at the 
confluence of competing interests of the United States, China, India, and Japan; all are 
also space powers.74  Great power relationships with ASEAN’s nation-states work both 
ways, as “ASEAN states seek to enmesh the great powers” using the United Nations and 
other multilateral institutions to thicken interdependent connections.75  But, to some, such 
acculturating “norms advanced by an association of weak states…can only be what 
stronger states make of them.”76  This suggests that ASEAN cooperation in space and on 
international space policy will be highly regulated by its members’ relationships with 
external powers. 
Amid such voluminous relevant contextual information, this thesis seeks to fill a 
gap in the existing literature that tends to treat Southeast Asia’s space programs as 
peripheral to other, primary units of analysis. Therefore, while there is abundant 
information on international relations theories on earth and on orbit, a similar amount on 
ASEAN non-space cooperative enterprises, and disaggregated encyclopedic information 
on Southeast Asian space programs (except for a few key studies that are generally 
surveys of capabilities), there is very little on this subset of regional space programs as a 
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vehicle for or indicator of regional cooperation or patterns of alignment. Thus, while the 
EU and ESA are often applied as case studies for the ASEAN Community, an “Asia-
Pacific Space Organization,” or even an “ASEAN Space Organization,” differences in 
developmental levels, geopolitical context, and regional organizational models limit the 
compatibility of this comparison. National space strategies in the developing countries of 
ASEAN, including their relationships to each other and external powers, warrant 
independent consideration to determine what such advanced technical interaction reveals 
regarding not only their future motions in space but also larger trends in regional 
integration. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In seeking balance at the confluence of ASEAN regionalism and space 
technology development, this thesis first seeks to correct academic oversight by moving 
Southeast Asian space programs from peripheral consideration to center focus as the units 
of analysis. While essentially a case study of this cluster of regional space programs, it 
seeks to achieve greater clarity by drawing the lines connecting individual points within 
this dim constellation while also defining and fixing those individual positions within a 
larger family. It is thus a study of organic network formation as much as of individual 
nodes. While the level of analysis is primarily regional, actions of domestic organizations 
that reach beyond the Southeast Asian region will also be examined. 
Fortunately, the working language of ASEAN and much of the international 
scientific community is English, opening many relevant primary sources. Most national 
space agencies post information on projects publicly, and the developmental (rather than 
security-centric) focus and collaborative nature of Southeast Asian space programs means 
a great deal of information is unclassified. Therefore, open source news, launch logs, 
progress reports, charters, minutes, official literature, and analyses of cooperation will be 
cross-referenced within the framework to construct a more detailed map of cooperative 
patterns. This map can then be compared to stated regional goals and similar attempts at 
practical international cooperation before conclusions are drawn. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Given the now-established context of the thesis within international relations 
theory, a greater exploration of the several themes can progress. Chapter II will further 
describe the origins, capabilities, and character of Southeast Asian space programs. 
Commonalities and opposing national strategies will be highlighted. While the focus is 
primarily on national space programs, any summary of Southeast Asian space efforts to 
date necessarily mentions some collaborative efforts with a number of external space 
powers, due to the financial and technical constraints on national governments.   
Chapter III will scrutinize the underlying factors influencing Southeast Asian 
countries’ cooperative ventures with foreign space powers:  Why do they choose the 
partners they do? Why does Vietnam cooperate with Japan, despite a contentious history?  
Why is Thailand, historically aligned closely with the United States, a founding member 
of China’s Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO)? The answers to these 
questions are as often found domestically as internationally, so chapter III bridges foreign 
policy and domestic politics. After briefly leveraging comparisons with extra-regional 
cooperative endeavors, this chapter will attempt to develop a more coherent map of these 
networks and to determine what effects external influences have on national and regional 
strategies. 
Chapter IV examines space cooperation within ASEAN and among its member 
states, both formalized at the organizational level and informal at the bureaucratic one, 
and on individual projects such as earth observation, remote sensing, and 
telecommunications. Choices of cooperation at the regional level will be compared to 
extra-regional examples and alternative arrangements for collaboration within bilateral 
and multilateral regional groupings. This information will also shed light on the progress 
and pitfalls of the regional community-building process. As chapter III charts extra-
regional interactions, chapter IV will do the same for intra-regional engagement.   
While each of the international relations theories is relevant to each subject, 
readers should note that chapter II’s discussion of national space programs is tightly 
coupled to perspectives of space nationalism. Chapter III’s span across foreign and 
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domestic influences enters multiple theoretical contexts but is also rooted heavily in 
realism, particularly many structural influences of technological determinism. Chapter IV 
rounds out the thesis and the theories by relying more on the lenses of global 
institutionalism and social interactionism.   
Finally, the three chapters will be collated to highlight vectors for space 
cooperation and competition and prospects for regional integration within the ASEAN 
Community member states’ space programs, before briefly drawing conclusions for U.S. 
policy in interacting with the region on Earth and in outer space. 
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II. SOUTHEAST ASIA’S NATIONAL SPACE PROGRAMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the developing world, government bureaucracies have been 
established to process satellite data or to conduct or control remote sensing 
operations. The fear of exploitation by the developed states emerged 
because information is power and remote sensing offered the power to 
develop resources. Many developing countries feared that since they 
would not be in control of the dissemination of sensed data their 
dependency on the developed world would simply be reinforced. In 
particular, they feared that they would be placed at a disadvantage in 
negotiations with multinational corporations, who would have access to 
satellite data which would put them in a superior bargaining position when 
negotiating for rights to exploit resources.77 
Southeast Asian nations face increasing pressure to improve their national 
capabilities in space for two reasons. First, there is an “up or out” perception—if 
developing nations do not work to converge with developed nations they risk persistent 
vulnerabilities to neocolonialism. The second reason is rooted in “a sense of technology’s 
power as a crucial agent of change…in the culture of modernity.”78 The first reason 
represents security motivations; the second, economic incentives. Space is viewed as a 
multiplier for political and socioeconomic security, in perceptions of state power strongly 
affected by space nationalism. But what do national efforts to enter space reveal 
regarding these states’ cooperation—or competition—with others in space?  This chapter 
contributes to an answer by building context as a starting point; therefore, its focus will 
be primarily domestic and historic.   
While there is no clear threshold of what qualifies as a national space program, 
Moltz offers that national programs must be viewed on a “continuum” ranging from 
embryonic national interest to “possession of a full spectrum of civil, commercial, and 
military space assets.”79 Rather than attempt to specifically rank Southeast Asian national 
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achievements in space via a tiered or laddered system, this chapter explores each nation’s 
space strategy by describing its past, present, and future vectors in space. Large and 
populous Indonesia receives the most elaborate exposition, as its space program’s 
longevity and range of pursuits provide a useful reference for themes present across the 
region. Overall, the developmental focus of Southeast Asian nations in space drives 
competition primarily into the economic realm, with space’s security dimension within 
Southeast Asian programs operating at a more subdued level across the region than it 
does among the larger global space powers. 
B. SOUTHEAST ASIA’S INCREASING SPACE INVESTMENTS 
Global government spending on space increased from $35 billion in 2000 to $72.9 
billion by 2012, despite the intervening effects of the Global Financial Crisis.80 The 
preponderance of the balance was sourced by the established and emerging space powers, 
such as the United States, Europe, Russia, China, Japan, and India).  However, a notable 
portion of the increase (especially in light of relative economic size) was driven by 
developing countries across the Global South and Southeast Asia in particular.81 In 2012, 
Vietnam led the region with $93 million, followed by Laos at $87 million, Indonesia at 
$38 million, Thailand at $20 million, and Malaysia at $18 million.82 Many outside 
industry experts validate these expenses as the development-oriented expenses their 
governments tout them as.  Regional governments tend to view such investments as seed 
money for economic growth similar to such spending in developed nations:  the Royal 
Observatory of Belgium claims that for each euro that country spends on space, three are 
generated toward GNP.83 Other governments make similar claims.  Critics, however, are 
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concerned that such expenditures represent misplaced priorities for developing countries 
in a region where public-sector spending on education remains underwhelming and 
health spending averages only half as much as percentage of GDP as in OECD states.84  
For example, while Laos, one of the region’s poorest countries, was spending such high 
startup fees for its new space program, it was receiving $153 million in Australian 
investment for basic education.85 Sustained budgets indicate, however, that Southeast 
Asian governments largely reference the former argument in evaluating space 
investments. 
C. INDONESIA 
As Southeast Asia’s largest and most populous state (nearly half of ASEAN) with 
nearly 250 million people, 17,000 islands spanning an area longer than the continental 
United States, and a favorable equatorial geography for launches and orbital exploitation, 
Indonesia has strong motivations and potential to develop a robust space program for a 
lower-middle income country. As a pioneer of the Cold War non-aligned movement with 
jealously protected postcolonial independence and an archipelagic geography that 
incentivizes use of space as a big tent under which to strengthen national unity, 
Indonesia’s space strategy has sought to knit together its diverse community by 
enhancing governance through communication, education, and economic growth. The 
Indonesian state’s investments in its space program indicate a push for economic 
modernization in a continuation of historic developmental state policies that seek to 
strengthen the regime and internally balance against a range of perceived challenges. 
Having established a formal space program as early as 1963, there was excitement 
as late as the 1990s that Indonesia could be one of Asia’s big three space programs (after 
Japan and China).86  While actual progress was much more modest, by virtue of its large 
aggregate resource base Indonesia is still a leader in the region with regard to space 
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investment and ambitions. It still hopes to be one of Asia’s top four space powers (though 
it has since been surpassed by India and South Korea, if not others).87 Indonesia’s 
geography provides a challenge for domain awareness and satellite imagery offers 
substantial cost reductions; however, purchasing large amounts of commercial imagery or 
high volumes of payload capacity from foreign providers imposes other costs that have 
encouraged Indonesia to climb the space ladder.88   
Setting the stage for a space economy that would pace simultaneous 
developmental-minded attempts to develop a domestic aerospace industry, Sukarno 
established the National Institute of Aeronautics and Space (LAPAN) in 1963 under the 
National Council for Aeronautics and Space of the Republic of Indonesia (DEPANRI) as 
part of a “constellation of national organizations regarding space [and aerospace] 
activities”89 that included ties with a range of state ministries from defense to 
development.90  LAPAN was built upon the Initial Scientific and Military Rocket Project 
(PRIMA), an affiliation between the Indonesian Air Force and Bandung Institute of 
Technology, and it is still tasked with developing space policy and a range of aerospace 
(including rocket and satellite) technologies through research and development (R&D).91  
LAPAN’s strong developmental orientation has focused on earth-oriented applications 
and eschewed prestige projects such as manned spaceflight; since Indonesia’s first 
astronaut candidate’s scheduled trip in 1986 aboard the U.S. Challenger shuttle was 
canceled by the intervening disaster, LAPAN has not renewed its interest.92  Rather, its 
slow progress has focused on climbing the space ladder by incrementally building its 
independent capacity to relieve the costs of its current commercially-purchased 
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architecture, with projects always promoted “within the scope of peaceful purposes and 
national development priorities.”93   
Indonesia has operated its own domestic satellites since 1976, as one of the first 
developing states and the fifteenth overall to do so.94 Its American-built Palapa series of 
satellites, named by Suharto himself after a fourteenth-century Hindu-Javanese leader’s 
oath to achieve national unity,95 provides regional telecommunications services 
(augmented in the late 1990s by the Indostar-1 or Cakrawarta-1).96 In addition to the two 
control stations and nine initial receiving stations included in the Palapa deal, Indonesia 
operates a ground station in Parepare, South Sulawesi, to downlink data from remote 
sensing satellites.97 LAPAN also partnered on development of the Sahadev Satellite 
Early Warning System, which integrates satellite and terrestrial sensors for natural 
disaster monitoring.98   
LAPAN has received an enormous influx of attention and resources in the 21st 
century following democratization and overthrow of Suharto’s New Order which 
disrupted previous patterns of state-led aerospace development. Historically, Indonesia’s 
state-led aviation company, IPTN, played the flagship role in the New Order’s 
developmental policies. The twentieth century Indonesian aerospace industry, including 
both IPTN and LAPAN, were expected to create high-quality jobs, enhance the 
economy’s technological sophistication, contribute to national defense, and instill 
national pride as both a symbolic banner of state achievement and economic multiplier.
99
  
IPTN, however, received the vast majority of state investment in a series of expensive 
                                                 
93 Wiryosumarto, “Indonesia’s Space Activities.” 
94 Robert C. Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries:  The Search for Security and Development on the 
Final Frontier (London:  Routledge, 2013), 10-11. 
95 Mayerchak, “Asia in Space,” 96; K. K. Nair, Space:  The Frontiers of Modern Defence (New Delhi:  
Knowledge World, 2006), 187. 
96 Wiryosumarto, “Indonesia’s Space Activities.” 
97 Initially receiving Landsat signals, Indonesia added SPOT, ERS-1, and JERS-1 capabilities in the mid-1990s.  
Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, loc 3684; Wiryosumarto, “Indonesia’s Space Activities.” 
98 “Satellite Early Warning System (Sahadev),” National Institute of Aeronautics and Space of Indonesia 
(LAPAN), accessed 16 March 2014, www.lapan.go.id.  
99 John Bowen, “Airline Hubs in Southeast Asia:  National Economic Development and Nodal Accessibility,” 
Journal of Transport Geography 8, no. 1 (2000):  26, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0966-6923(99)00030-7. 
 30 
efforts to build the domestic aviation industry. When Suharto and Golkar were 
overthrown in 1998, IPTN’s close connections to President B. J. Habibie and absence of 
any profits (ever) resulted in its removal from its formerly cozy government embrace. 
IPTN was forced to privatize as crony networks were broken up during democratization 
and liberalization, and it was reorganized as PTDI, also known as Indonesian Aerospace 
(IAe).100  But old habits die hard, and by 2011, the democratic government had already 
floated two trillion rupiah ($234 million) to IAe to keep it solvent.101  Industry Minister 
Mohommed S. Hidayat reiterated in 2014 plans to develop and protect the local 
aerospace industry to meet Indonesia’s strategic demands.102  Hidayat also cast this effort 
as part of a broader “focus on deepening the industrial structure” of Indonesia, including 
small- and medium-sized businesses, though much emphasis is on high-tech projects that 
are expected to trickle down through the economy.103   
Overall, however, government support for IAe has shifted to less direct methods, 
using LAPAN (which as a state agency faces little pressure to privatize) as a subsidy 
back door to provide lucrative contracts for IAe and the broader aerospace industry. In a 
more savory nod to democratic, market-based policies in 2014, the government provided 
LAPAN with 400 billion rupiah ($40 million) for R&D on a new joint project with IAe, 
the N219 aircraft.104 Part of the democratic government’s return on investment for 
aerospace subsidies is the expectation—shared between the executive and now co-equal 
legislative branches—that benefits will ripple through the economy into other industries, 
building national resilience and creating a technological-industrial complex, similar to 
                                                 
100 “Our History,” Indonesian Aerospace, updated 2011, http://www.indonesian-
aerospace.com/aboutus.php?m=aboutus&t=aboutus8;  “Manufacturing in Indonesia:  On a Wing and a Prayer,” The 
Economist, 15 February 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/business/21596589-state-aerospace-firm-risks-
forgetting-lessons-asian-crisis-wing-and-prayer.  
101 “OSC Analysis:  Overview of Indonesia’s National Science and Technology Ambitions,” Open Source 
Center, April 23, 2014. 
102 “Analysis:  Aerospace Industry Will Be Developed and Protected,” AntaraNews, March 7, 2014, 
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/422746/menperin-industri-dirgantara-akan-dikembangkan-dan-dilindungi.  
103 “Analysis:  Aerospace Industry.” 
104 “LAPAN and PTDI Ready to Build Passenger Aircraft,” National Institute of Aeronautics and Space of 
Indonesia (LAPAN), 25 March 2014, www.lapan.go.id; “Analysis:  Aerospace Industry.” 
 31 
how NASA operates across dozens of constituencies across all 50 United States.105  
LAPAN has grown to currently operate 16 primary facilities spread over ten locations 
throughout the archipelago but centered on its Jakarta headquarters.106  The government 
imagines each of these as seeds for a new series of techno-industrial clusters, much as 
IPTN turned Bandung into a hub in Indonesia’s growing strategic arms industry.107  But 
LAPAN’s resurgence is much more than simply as a front organization for IAe; rather, 
the LAPAN-IAe agenda is part of a broader national economic program launched by 
President S. B. Yudhoyono targeting 15 strategic industries, including revitalization of 
the defense industry.108 
As part of this economic plan, LAPAN received more funding and new mandates, 
including for a new series of increasingly domestically-sourced satellite projects. The 
LAPAN-A2 microsatellite, Indonesia’s first domestically designed and manufactured 
satellite, is scheduled to piggyback a ride aboard a foreign booster in 2015.109  LAPAN-
A2 was conceived in 2008, following a capacity-building program in Germany to transfer 
procurement, licensing, and testing capabilities to LAPAN engineers that produced the 
LAPAN-A1, launched in 2007.110  LAPAN-A1 has forwarded basic video data for seven 
years, allowing domestic operators to train on data retrieval; its now-degrading orbit 
offers its own lessons.111 Indonesia seeks to expand its current capacity to a wider range 
spanning from telecommunications to forest fire and reef monitoring, and LAPAN-A2’s 
more advanced payload indicates movement in this direction. In addition to a more 
advanced digital camera, it also carries a test message repeater for the Indonesian 
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Amateur Radio Organization (Orari) to use in disaster relief and an Automatic 
Identification System for ships to expand its maritime domain awareness.112   
In all, five satellites are planned in the LAPAN-A series as part of Indonesia’s 
satellite development roadmap. LAPAN-A3 is planned to carry a magnetometer to study 
solar activities (the first LAPAN project to look beyond Earth) and an agricultural project 
in partnership with the Bogor Institute of Agriculture.113 A remote sensing B-series (built 
upon earlier LAPSAT-1 and -2 engineering models114) and a C-series for communications 
are both scheduled to follow in 2018.115 
LAPAN-A2 was more than triple the $1 million cost of its predecessor; however, 
the Indonesian People’s Representative Council’s (DPR) 2013 Space Law more than 
provided by expanding LAPAN’s 2014 budget nearly 60 percent over the 526 billion 
($52 million) rupiah budget of 2013.116 LAPAN’s budget had already more than 
quadrupled in the previous decade, and quintupled since the beginning of the century.117  
The new Space Law also mandates further satellite and rocket technology development, 
bilateral and international cooperation to facilitate greater technology transfer, and 
development of a new 25-year master plan for building Indonesia’s space industry; it also 
reiterates legal restrictions that space applications be for purely peaceful purposes and 
regulates space port construction and private sector partnerships.118   
LAPAN’s primary launch facility for its experimental and sounding rockets is 
currently its West Java Pameungpeuk launch pad. Indonesia, however, has aspired for 
some time to capitalize on its equatorial geography by constructing a larger space port to 
support its own launcher ambitions as well as commercial launches. After eyeing 
locations in Sumatra and West Papua, Indonesia has recently made moves toward 
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building the long-awaited spaceport on Morotai Island in the Moluccas. Favored for its 
low population, Pacific orientation, and equatorial location, Morotai hosted a series of 
LAPAN rocket launches accompanied by unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) surveys in 
December 2013.119  Indonesia’s eyeing of Biak, Papua, before settling on Morotai for its 
proposed spaceport is also partially rooted in desires to spread development—and 
therefore national stakeholding—to its more restive outer islands.120   
After decades of development, the rocket program to populate such a facility is 
still just reaching adolescence; though Indonesia has launched multiple successively-
larger RX-250, RX-320, and RX-420 sub-orbital rockets since 1987, the three-stage RX-
420 in July 2009 only reached an altitude of around 66 kilometers, well short of the 100 
kilometer altitude commonly considered the boundary of space and even further below 
the energy required for orbit.121  While LAPAN’s rocket program progresses on a variety 
of rockets, including defense cooperation with the Indonesian National Armed Forces 
(TNI) on the Rhan series,122 the latest LAPAN rocket launched still only had a theoretical 
range between 100 and 200 kilometers.123    
It is in LAPAN’s rocketry development that the difference between rhetoric and 
reality in the Space Law’s mandate of peaceful practices is most noticeable, as clearly 
some gray area exists within the dual-use conundrum. LAPAN’s cooperation with the 
TNI on rocketry includes plans to adapt 122mm rockets for use by the army and navy.124  
In 2014 LAPAN tested rockets for naval applications and suborbital launches as well as 
its LSU 03 surveillance UAV for long-endurance missions and airborne remote 
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sensing.125 Regarding rocketry, Indonesia specifically cites self-reliance to avoid 
dependence on raw materials (including propellant) that could face greater restrictions in 
the future under an expanded Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).126 LAPAN 
is not exactly a wolf in sheep’s clothing, but it is certainly an incubator for Indonesia’s 
domestically-sourced arms industry. Both LAPAN and IAe are therefore active in 
Indonesia’s shift from constructing support platforms toward increased domestic sourcing 
of primary weapons systems, including warships, submarines, and assault rifles in 
addition to LAPAN’s short-range rockets, medium-range missiles, and UAVs. Editorials 
argue such weapons are essential to “keep the peace” and put Indonesia on par with the 
limited number of nations with such achievements to increase international respect.127 
LAPAN’s rhetoric frequently emphasizes how its technological forays benefit 
both security and economic modernization. LAPAN’s chief frequently reiterates the 
connection between technological and national independence now enshrined in the 2013 
Space Law, citing independent and proprietary national information-gathering assets as a 
precondition for security.128 Other LAPAN dual-use technologies are increasingly 
integrated into national security. Indonesia’s Maritime Security Coordination Agency 
(Bakorkamla) is integrating LAPAN’s radars with other institutional assets into a 
comprehensive system for safeguarding Indonesian waters.129   
LAPAN’s 2010–2014 Strategic Plan is revealing in its aspirations for 
socioeconomic development based on competitive advantage, natural and human 
resources, and cultural mastery of science and technology to improve national security, 
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justice, democracy, and prosperity.130  In it, LAPAN plays a “crucial role” in achieving 
national progress in ways that also build national unity and uphold religious values.131  It 
consistently emphasizes national self-reliance in the field of aerospace technology, in 
particular the need to strengthen the domestic missile industry, bolster satellite remote 
sensing for increased mapping of border and post-conflict areas and development of outer 
islands, and facilitate natural disaster mitigation through increased early warning and 
emergency response.
132
  It also specifies long-term transformation of younger generations 
through education in science and technology (S&T), including increased “space 
mindedness.”133 To that end, LAPAN recently partnered with seven Indonesian 
universities,134 and in 2013 the Indonesian Research Ministry chose aerospace as the 
theme for its Technology Awakening Day.135 Counter to challenges that Indonesia’s 
aerospace expenditures are made at the expense of more important investments in health 
and education, Indonesian elites share a general consensus that these expenditures are 
such investments.136 National security, economic and educational development, and 
environmental security are not compartmentalized. 
Indonesia’s active space program (and larger aerospace industrial complex) is 
thus an illustrative example of persistent policies of state development, developing 
country power aggregation, and building national resilience. These themes will remain 
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important as the discussion extends to other Southeast Asian states. Rather than 
responding to the shock of a Sputnik moment, Indonesia has demonstrated marked 
consistency in its desire to leverage aerospace technologies. Indonesia’s persistence and 
respectable investment in space applications has been furthered substantially by the 
inertia its large size bestows upon it; likewise, its rising aggregate wealth fueled by its 
abundant natural resources and the twin dynamos of democratization and liberalization 
has contributed new momentum toward its space ambitions. With the largest domestic 
market for space applications and a long history of incremental progress, it is likely to 
remain the regional space player with the most ambitious agenda for a full spectrum 
space program. But Indonesian efforts in space will continue to be hobbled in the short 
term by relatively low technical capacity rooted in its modest educational base in a 
country where over 100 million still live on under $2 per day.137 Many of LAPAN’s 
engineers must still be educated overseas and critics are concerned that throwing money 
at LAPAN will only go so far without matching investments in human resources.138  
Indonesia has long chased backward linkages from LAPAN and its aerospace industry 
into building a stronger technical society:  one of the early goals of its telecom satellites 
was to speed coverage of remote areas by university-level education.139 In the future, 
these twin forces of size and human resources will be the greatest determinants of 
Indonesia’s altitude in space in relation to its regional neighbors, many of whom have 
made notable achievements themselves. 
D. MALAYSIA 
Malaysia is one of the most advanced Southeast Asian nations measured by 
economic size, per capita income, education, infrastructure, and institutions inherited 
after a peaceful transition to independence from British colonialism. Its bifurcated 
geography, position astride busy strategic maritime routes, and land- and sea-based 
natural resources all potentially benefit from space applications. In 2002, it established 
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the National Space Agency, called ANGKASA after the Malay word for “space,” within 
the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation (MOSTI) to better promote peaceful 
uses of outer space, international cooperation, the advancement of space knowledge, 
reinforcement of national policies, and “information system support of diversified 
applications.”140 ANGKASA’s vision and mission explicitly mention the primacy of 
development within its agenda, referencing “knowledge generation” for “wealth creation” 
and “societal well-being” through support for “development of the new economy.”141   
Its 2002 formalization merely provided a flagship agency to head ongoing 
national efforts across a range of space activities. Malaysia has utilized remote sensing 
for forestry applications since the 1970s, establishing in 1988 a national resource and 
environmental management program coordinated by the Malaysia Centre for Remote 
Sensing, now Malaysia Remote Sensing Agency.142 In 1989, Malaysia established its 
first government space office, the Planetarium Division, to foster greater scientific 
educational outreach; this division is indicative of the focus on inspiring youth toward 
cutting edge industries as a complementary goal to the developmental focus.143 The 
Planetarium Division was absorbed by the Space Science Studies institution (BAKSA) to 
expand its responsibilities. BAKSA was itself absorbed into ANGKASA in 2004. 
Telecommunications and broadcasting have been a huge sector for space 
applications in Malaysia’s rapidly developing economy. By 1996 Malaysia had 
contracted to launch MEASAT-1 and -2 to better domestically support this 
infrastructure.144 It then stepped up the space ladder with a training program to learn how 
to construct its own satellites in an effort to transfer technology toward building a 
domestic satellite-manufacturing industry, culminating in the Tiungsat microsatellite in 
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2000 that carried a variety of communications and remote sensing capabilities into Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO).145 Tiungsat was followed by the much larger (and foreign-built) earth 
imaging satellite RazakSat, with a high resolution camera to provide more timely data to 
“cater to Malaysia’s specific use” after being launched into equatorial orbit on a SpaceX 
Falcon rocket in 2009; Malaysia sought to fill a niche for equatorial countries 
underserviced by foreign satellites in non-equatorial orbits with higher absentee ratios.146  
Malaysia now has several dedicated satellite technology development facilities at both 
government agencies and Malaysian universities.147 Its remote sensing and other space 
applications are also well tied into the nation’s university system, which is itself a 
regional leader.148 
MEASAT, or the Malaysia East Asia Satellite, which by its own affirmation 
facilitated a “rapid increase in Malaysian infrastructure development in both the 
telecommunications and broadcasting industries,” became fully commercial in 1998 
under MEASAT Satellite Systems, which has grown to operate a fleet of five satellites 
offering services worldwide from its center in Cyberjaya and control center on Pulau 
Langkawi.149 Malaysia now also operates over a half dozen meteorological ground 
stations, while continuing its efforts in space science, educational outreach, and generally 
building societal infrastructure to support further space endeavors.150 Aside from its 
operational success in the industry, Malaysian space competency has been well-
represented internationally, particularly by Dr. Mazlan Othman, director of the UN Office 
for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) between 1999 and 2013, minus a five-year hiatus 
from 2002 until 2007 to establish ANGKASA as its first director.151 Malaysia also 
sought to raise its profile in space (useful in creating a market for its commercial space 
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aspirations) and further promote public support for space investments through its first 
angkasawan (astronaut) program; as part of a defense acquisition from Russia, a 
Malaysian orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Sheikh Muszaphar Shukor, was trained and flown to 
the International Space Station (ISS) for ten days in 2007.152 
Within the region, Malaysia’s economic and international leadership translate into 
a high degree of space aptitude relative to its neighbors. Like other Southeast Asian space 
programs, it devotes its space applications toward a peaceful development agenda, albeit 
with a highly market-based, commercialized, and internationalized application of its 
space activities toward broader socioeconomic development. 
E. THAILAND 
Thailand has Southeast Asia’s second-largest economy and also one of its most 
sophisticated. Though strongly influenced by the region’s former colonial powers, it 
maintained titular independence throughout that period and has since sustained its 
historic leadership role within the region. Having benefitted substantially from American 
investment during the Cold War and Vietnam conflict, Thailand has leveraged its central 
geographical position toward establishing itself as a regional hub for commerce and 
international political discourse; this national strategy guides its investments in space. 
Thailand’s space activities have centered mostly on natural resource management and its 
now-experienced use of space data that positions it as a regional space services 
provider.153   
Thailand has been utilizing remote sensing from NASA’s ERTS-1/Landsat since 
1971 through the Thailand Remote Sensing Programme and later under the National 
Research Council of Thailand.154 The initialization of Thailand’s Ground Receiving 
Station at Lad Krabang, Bangkok, in 1982 marked a regional first, establishing Thailand 
early as a regional distribution hub for Landsat, SPOT, NOAA, ERS, and MOS satellite 
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data.155 Thailand’s first of six commercial Thaicom geostationary communications 
satellites was launched in 1993 under a “30-year Domestic Communications Satellite 
Operating Agreement” established in 1991 by the then Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. The venture was dubbed “Thaicom” by the king himself “as a symbol 
of the linkage between Thailand and modern communications technology.”156  
Thaicom’s lease and operations were originally operated by the Shinawatra Satellite 
Company, founded and owned by later Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra; conflicts of 
interest and controversy regarding the sale of the family’s shares to a Singaporean 
company and coincident amendments to Thai telecommunications regulations brought 
Thaicom into the midst of protests and the subsequent coup that resulted in Shinawatra’s 
ouster and exile in 2006.157 Thaicom was again caught in the middle of domestic 
turbulence when the government compelled it to resort to electronic jamming to block 
broadcasts from the anti-government People Channel Television (PCT) company in 
2010.158 Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, was subsequently deposed as prime 
minister by a 2014 coup.   
After a series of reorganizations, the public Geo-Informatics and Space 
Technology Development Agency (GISTDA) was formed under the now Ministry of 
Science and Technology in 2000 to assume “all responsibilities and activities for space 
technology and geo-informatics applications.”159  Since 2008, Thailand has operated the 
Thailand Remote Observation Satellite (THEOS) from its THEOS Control and Receiving 
Station in Sriracha, Chonburi.160  Similar to the Indonesian Palapa series, THEOS was 
also named Thaichote by the Thai king, “signifying the glory of Thailand.”161  Thailand 
has aggressively sought to maintain its regional leadership in space services by 
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thickening training pipelines for its space industry, leveraging both international 
cooperation and domestic cooperation between GISTDA and domestic universities.162  
The European contract for THEOS also included training for Thai scientists and engineers 
which could be leveraged toward future projects.163 A similar technology transfer 
program in the United Kingdom in which 12 Thai engineers from Mahanikorn University 
in Bangkok participated culminated in the launch of Thai-Paht, Thailand’s first 
microsatellite, which carried earth observation and store-and-forward communications 
payloads.164 These projects helped develop programs within multiple Thai educational 
institutions that now feed its space sector. 
Thailand established an early lead as a hub for regional space services; its space 
strategy has consistently sought to exploit and reinforce this role within the regional 
space community. It has approached this policy from multiple angles, including 
expanding data hub services through a “worldwide network of distributors” and 
maintaining an active role in space law.165 Aside from its geocentric name, GISTDA’s 
earthbound focus on space data market and international networking is indicated by its 
lack of participation in prestige projects such as manned spaceflight.166 Domestic 
awareness of space activities is high for the region, providing the sort of cultural inertia 
that could prove valuable to the nation in future space ambitions. Recurring political 
turmoil, however, continues to dampen growth in an otherwise regional standout; 
periodic government legitimacy crises undoubtedly do little to forward consistent 
investments in space strategy. Finding a middle ground between its entrenched political 
factions could give a strong boost to an otherwise central regional space program before 
things fall apart. 
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Vietnam has been a Thai rival for influence in mainland Southeast Asia for 
several centuries. Its communist government presided over a half-century of regional 
conflict until the end of the Cold War, as Vietnam became a battleground of post-colonial 
French, American, Soviet, and Chinese spheres of influence. The end of the Cold War 
was followed by a period of steady economic growth and incrementally-increasing 
openness, as Vietnam sought to reestablish its historic role as a regional cultural and 
economic power. Indeed, Vietnam’s GDP increased 700 percent between 1985 and 2010, 
with a corresponding poverty rate reduction from 60 percent to 10.6 percent, uplifting it 
to lower middle income status.167  Seeking to leverage development toward regional ends 
and also toward domestic political legitimacy, the party government has pursued a space 
policy that focuses primarily on economic growth and security with some prestige 
projects to bolster its agenda.   
Vietnam put the first Southeast Asian in space in 1980 through its strategic 
partnership with the Soviet Union, when cosmonaut-researcher Pham Tuan rode a Soyuz 
to the Salyut station as part of the Soviet Interkosmos program.168 Aside from this 
highlight—largely a project of Cold War prestige politicking—Vietnam’s space program, 
established that same year as the National Committee for Space Research and 
Application of Vietnam, made little progress.169 That committee’s mandate to direct 
space research and mobilization of technological resources toward economic 
development demonstrated few noteworthy results until Vietnam’s loss of its Soviet 
patron in the 1990s forced the country to align its policies toward greater reform and 
opening. In 2006, the Vietnamese government established the Space Technology Institute 
(STI) within the Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology (VAST) with a broader 
mandate encompassing a range of earth-based space applications with particular 
emphasis on climbing the space ladder through technology transfer and increasingly 
                                                 
167 Le Hong Hiep, “Vietnam’s Strategic Trajectory:  From Internal Development to External Engagement,” ASPI 
Strategic Insights, no. 59 (2012): 3. 
168 Noichim, “ASEAN Space Organization,” 116.   
169 Ibid., 113.   
 43 
independent projects.170 VAST is also tasked with building a domestic space industrial 
base by cooperating with universities on postgraduate education and the public on 
popularization of space science and technology.171   
VAST operates at least two receivers for remote sensing data from foreign 
satellites in addition to newer receivers for its first geostationary communications 
satellite, Vinasat-1, launched by foreign booster at a cost of $180 million to end 
Vietnam’s $15 million per year reliance on satellite services from regional rival 
Thailand.172  Vinasat-2 followed in 2012, focusing on remote area communications for a 
larger regional audience. Both Vinasats are also touted by domestic scientists as symbols 
of Vietnam’s newly-elevated international image and improved economic 
performance.173 Vietnam also began operating its first earth observation satellite, the 
Vietnam National Resources, Environment, and Disaster Monitoring Satellite System 
(VNREDSat-1), in 2013 in a hedge to mitigate losses to the Vietnamese economy from 
natural disasters and environmental degradation. A follow-up, VNREDSat-1b is 
scheduled for 2017 to augment the program’s capabilities. VNREDSat’s disaster 
management applications point to space investments as a response to increasing questions 
of regime legitimacy following communism’s post-Cold War retrenchment. The 
Vietnamese regime clearly recalls the string of natural disasters that combined with 
economic chaos and international challenges in the 1980s to threaten regime legitimacy 
post-reunification.174 
Vietnam’s plans to continuously upgrade GPS applications to facilitate coastal 
construction projects and maritime management play an important role in multiple 
aspects of national development in this long, littoral nation with its rugged highlands. Its 
installation of GPS receivers on thousands of fishing vessels for weather and rescue 
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applications also has security implications by facilitating domain awareness through 
potential registration requirements in Vietnam’s contested offshore waters.175 VAST’s 
2030 vision includes completion of the Vietnam National Satellite Center (VNSC) at Hoa 
Lac Hi-Tech Park, now scheduled for 2020.176 The center is expected to serve as a 
“launching pad” for a series of larger, increasingly independent satellite projects of the 
Dragon and Lotus series.   
Despite this ambitious investment, Vietnam is aware of several hurdles it faces, 
including lack of a qualified labor force. Though literate by regional standards and 
despite earlier efforts to build a technical base, higher technical education is still lacking 
in Vietnam and qualified space engineers must generally acquire their expertise abroad; 
the satellite center is seeking to mitigate this deficiency by increasingly training its own 
personnel. Vietnam hopes the satellite park will allow the country to claim regional 
leadership in space over Indonesia and Malaysia, which it considers to be the current 
leaders.177 These substantial investments, backed by state loans from abroad, are likely to 
combine with the increasing inertia of Vietnam’s economy in general to produce a 
powerful vector toward a greater role in space for Vietnam. 
G. SINGAPORE 
Maritime city-state Singapore is truly a “mer-lion” of regional space activities:  a 
relatively recent state-commercial partnership nonetheless leverages its unique 
capabilities to make a noticeable splash in the local space scene. Singapore’s citizenry is 
among the world’s wealthiest and best-educated, and the state-led development model 
followed by the dominant Lee family’s People’s Action Party (PAP) has led to close ties 
between commercial, civil, and military programs and R&D. 
Singapore has one of the world’s leading telecommunications infrastructures, 
facilitating its role as a regional—and global—services hub. State-run Singtel dominates 
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this industry, as the country operates two satellite ground stations at Bukit Timah and 
Sentisa Island.178 National University of Singapore’s Centre for Remote Imaging, 
Sensing, and Processing is a well-known space service provider; its unique “multi-
mission ground station built around the open system concept” is a leader in flexible 
architecture to facilitate scalable capabilities.179  It currently receives remote sensing data 
from a wide range of foreign providers for redistribution and conducts sophisticated 
research in a wide range of space applications, including ocean and coastal studies, 
environmental monitoring, and Synthetic Aperture Radar data monitoring.180  
Meanwhile, Nanyang Technological University’s Satellite Research Centre coordinated 
with the Defence Science Organization’s National Laboratories to domestically design 
and build an earth observation and communications satellite, X-SAT, launched aboard 
foreign booster in 2011.181  X-SAT has since been followed by a second satellite, VELOX-
PII, launched by Russia in late 2013.182 
Unlike other Southeast Asian states, Singapore’s strong PAP government has less 
incentive to rely on its space program as a flagship program of national prestige to build 
legitimacy. Likewise, the heavy commercial-academic role suggests Singapore’s space 
program is an outgrowth of Singapore’s economic wealth and human capital, rather than 
an intended driver thereof as elsewhere in the region.  Nonetheless, its government will 
likely continue to support such investments as it seeks to build and maintain its 
competitive advantage in the region. The city-state’s military is well-trained and 
equipped and plays an active role in international security cooperation, so that further 
defense support for R&D and space technology applications are likely in the future.  
Singapore’s deep pockets, well-established technical expertise backed by a well-educated 
society, and close ties among its defense, commercial, and civil sectors within its PAP-
dominated system means that Singapore easily adds space applications to its list of 
                                                 
178 Noichim, “ASEAN Space Organization,” 103.   
179 “CRISP,” National University of Singapore, accessed March 16, 2014, http://www.crisp.nus.edu.sg.  
180 Ibid. 
181 Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, loc 3977.   
182 “Satellite Research Centre (SaRC),” Nanyang Technological University, accessed March 17, 2013, 
http://www.sarc.eee.ntu.edu.sg/Pages/Home.aspx.  
 46 
regional leads despite its late entry. Its geo-economical centricity, manifesting itself 
through the added dimension of space applications, is likely to reinforce its role as a 
regional leader and hub well into the future.   
H. THE PHILIPPINES 
The Philippines is the second-most populous Southeast Asian nation, and as 
another diverse archipelagic nation it shares with Indonesia similar motivations to pursue 
space applications for national unity, development, and governance. It also shares similar 
limitations regarding human capital and a developmental level within the lower-middle 
income bracket. As a former U.S. colony with close ties to the United States, its 
experiences and incentives toward developing domestic space technologies differ slightly 
from other Southeast Asian nations. 
The Philippines does not have a formalized space agency to coordinate its space 
activities, although it has had the Science and Technology Coordinating Council 
Committee on Space Technology Applications (STCC-COSTA) since 1995. As the lead 
organization for space affairs it has filled the coordination gap between various 
government agencies and the private sector on a number of research and space 
technology applications.183 Though applications of space technology permeate Philippine 
society as much as other regional players, their primary focus has been on remote 
sensing, astronomical and atmospheric services, and communications via commercial 
provider.184 To meet these ends the Philippines operates the National Mapping and 
Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) to coordinate with foreign governments for 
some satellite remote sensing and to conduct coastal surveys.185 The astronomical and 
atmospheric services have been coordinated by PAGASA, the Philippine Atmospheric, 
Geophysical, and Astronomical Services Administration, under the Department of 
Science and Technology since 1972. Concerned primarily with promoting economic 
security through meteorology services and natural disaster early warning and mitigation, 
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PAGASA grew out of the Philippine Meteorological Service that was centered on the 
Manila Observatory, which itself dates back to 1865 and Spanish colonialism.186  
Meanwhile, the large Philippines telecommunications market—and a wider regional 
audience—have been serviced by foreign-built satellites purchased through the Mabuhay 
Satellite Corporation.187 
While most Filipinos do not consider their country “behind” the region in space 
due to these disaggregated but adequate efforts, some have argued that a single national 
space agency could better provide a more streamlined, coordinated national agenda and 
begin expanding the underwhelming domestic space community.188 Arguments to 
formalize a national space strategy and acquire national satellite assets have been steadily 
accumulating louder national security overtones. Events in the South China Sea over the 
last decade have underlined critical underinvestment in its navy, air force, and domain 
awareness capabilities and the routing of its national election results through Singapore 
by the Philippines’ Singtel provider highlighted additional embarrassing 
vulnerabilities.189  Despite a few vocal proponents, however, the Philippine Space Act of 
2012, on file with the national House since its namesake year, has made little headway in 
paving the way for a national space agency.190 
Much as in the realm of military modernization, the Philippines, despite its size 
and archipelagic geography, is still playing catchup in the national space sector. Both 
may be results of its protection under the U.S. defense umbrella for so long, which 
provided it with less incentive to invest in building domestic capabilities than others in 
the region with a postcolonial history of having to fend for themselves. On the other 
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hand, perhaps the Philippines’ devolved management of space applications husbands 
scarce resources by reducing duplication of efforts and its deferment to commercial space 
service providers will be well adapted to a future of increased space commercialization. 
I. MYANMAR 
Despite being one of Southeast Asia’s larger and more populous countries, 
Myanmar is one of the region’s least-developed countries (LDC) due to decades of 
autarkic military autocracy.  But its recent re-opening to the West and tepid reforms may 
gather momentum, and there is substantial optimism regarding Myanmar’s potential for 
future market growth and as a source of resources.  Though a long way away, shortly 
after Myanmar’s opening a Japanese company began conducting a feasibility study for a 
satellite to be used by the meteorology and hydrology department of Myanmar’s transport 
ministry.191  The resource-rich country’s size presents potential as a growing market for 
remote sensing, satellite communications, and meteorology. Its politically powerful 
military, the Tatmadaw, seeking a force multiplier for defense and internal governance, 
may develop designs in the space sector as well. To that end, Myanmar is reported to 
have recently set up a five-member committee to oversee satellite development.192 
J. LAOS 
The communist government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) 
presides over one of the region’s other LDCs that has often been dominated by the affairs 
of its larger neighbors. It coordinates its modest space activities through its Department 
of Space Technology (DST), established in 2008 under the National Authority for 
Science and Technology (NAST). DST’s ambitions are modest; nonetheless, that Laos 
even operates the DST is a significant development considering its technical and resource 
base. Its proffered interest is in using space to develop human resources, international 
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cooperation, and remote sensing utilization, among other projects.193 Its first satellite, 
Laosat-1, and an accompanying ground station are currently scheduled to begin 
operations in mid-2015.194 
K. CAMBODIA 
Cambodia, in a race from the bottom with Myanmar, can scarcely afford to meet 
the threshold for space activities. Its still-recent legacy of Khmer Rouge purges—
especially of anything or anyone remotely intellectual—has left a long road to recovery. 
Aside from attendance at a handful of regional developmental conferences including 
space applications on the agenda, any interest it has shown toward space applications has 
been completely reliant on foreign sponsorship. Even in this shell-shocked country, 
however, awareness of a future in space shines through, with the torch currently carried 
by a few local rocket clubs. 
L. BRUNEI 
The small but wealthy petro-sultanate of Brunei meets its space needs through 
Intelsat earth stations, providing meteorological information to its citizens through 
foreign contract via the Brunei Meteorological Service (BMS), Department of Civil 
Aviation (DCA), and Ministry of Communications.195 
M. CONCLUSION 
Within Southeast Asia’s emerging space programs, there is no natural leader, 
though several nations contend for that status. Sheer economic size does not overcome 
shortcomings in human capital; on the other hand, large countries with strong geographic, 
political, and economic incentives to utilize space can pace the efforts of wealthier 
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counterparts by leveraging their larger aggregate resource bases. While there is clearly a 
lower-tier of regional space actors, there is also an active cadre of notable regional space 
actors:  Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, and even the Philippines 
each demonstrate some areas in which they have a comparative advantage.   
With the exception of Indonesia eventually developing independent launch 
capability, each of the leading nations is likely to work to protect its own rice bowl while 
seeking to reduce its reliance on others in other sectors of the space economy. Purely 
prestige projects such as paying for manned spaceflight are likely to remain one-shot 
national adventures in the near future, as nations focus on their developmental agendas 
and ulterior security motives. So, while competition exists among the region’s space 
programs, such space nationalism is primarily at the economic development and market 
services levels; prestige projects play in as a sort of advertisement for a nation’s space 
prowess for both national and international space consumers. While nationalist security 
dimensions still maintain steady undertones, particularly within the realms of maritime 
domain awareness and rocketry, insofar as any regional “space race” remains primarily 
restricted to economic applications, it could remain a positive-sum game by spurring 
investment in space as an economic multiplier and by building national capacity across a 
broader range of interconnected sectors (particularly education). 
None of these nations reached their current position on the space ladder by 
themselves, but reaped the benefits of technological diffusion from a wide range of 
foreign relationships. Despite vast leaps in regional capacities for space applications since 
the dawn of the space age, the pace of future development is still highly dependent on 
external forces. Now that the individual national trajectories have been described, further 
refinement of their current position and future projections must take into account this 
wide range of external influences on the region’s designs in space.  
 51 
III. EXTRA-REGIONAL COOPERATION AND FOREIGN 
POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN SPACE PROGRAMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In an essentially anarchic world where the big powers [have] the 
capability to define the international system for the smaller states and [are] 
much more willing to come to terms among themselves than be guided by 
notions of equality and fair play, small states… [have] to do all they could 
to ensure their own survival, from diplomacy to balancing.196 
Chapter II outlined Southeast Asian space developments to date, with an emphasis 
on the basic conditions from which they arose. This chapter explains how domestic 
politics interact with geopolitics to influence states’ cooperative relationships with extra-
regional space powers. One could cite Southeast Asia’s rapidly increasing wealth and 
corresponding rise of a middle class with demands for higher standards of living that 
space technologies facilitate as a means to the developments outlined in chapter II, but 
these means do not sufficiently explain the motives.197  Nor is the cycle of technological 
diffusion referenced in Chapter I an inevitable progression. Rather, governments must 
each make a deliberate choice to invest in space technologies based on some expected 
return on investment. While Chapter II explained domestic motivations to access space, 
responses to external factors can likewise incentivize such investments. Though 
Southeast Asian states have different developmental levels and government types, they 
share similarities in the way their domestic politics interact with geopolitics to motivate 
development of their space programs as perceived tools of internal balancing to facilitate 
freedom of action and regime legitimacy. 
Due to the advanced technologies and expenditures involved, developing 
countries must cooperate with advanced space powers if they expect a reasonable return 
on investment. Meanwhile, how governments justify the large domestic expense inherent 
in any space activity ensures that foreign policies with extra-regional space powers are 
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firmly rooted in local politics. Despite efforts to romanticize mankind’s journey toward 
the final frontier, many “of the policies that have driven modern space programs have 
emanated from a much more complex yet primordial impulse—the improvement and 
even the survival of the state.”198  The advanced space powers themselves (the United 
States, Russia, Japan, China, India, and Europe) have their own motives to cooperate with 
Southeast Asian states in space as outreach to extend “soft power” or create new markets 
by locking users into proprietary technological systems.199 They also face unique 
constraints, such as the MTCR that limits the international transfer of rocket technologies 
or the United States’ current regulation of all satellite components as munitions under its 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) regime.200 Understanding how a region 
of states jealously protective of their postcolonial independence manages cooperation 
with great powers on sensitive technological issues is a useful geopolitical concept.   
Before examining individual state cases, it is worth noting some shared 
philosophical principles in Southeast Asian social and state psyches that argue 
technologically deterministic, structural explanations for space development. In Southeast 
Asia as elsewhere, chosen technological paths seem to “embody humanity’s choice of its 
future.”201 After the region’s states chose independence following World War II and 
sought to increase their capacity for independent action through economic growth and 
integration following the Cold War, they have almost uniformly created government 
bureaucracies to independently leverage space applications, especially remote sensing. 
This structural convergence—a characteristic of technological determinism—can 
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therefore be seen to influence individualistic space nationalism, as regimes seek to build 
national and regional “resilience” to protect the national resources states had wrested 
away from colonial powers.202  For Southeast Asian states, space is an opportunity to 
“exploit cosmic resources” that augment power—it is an increasingly indispensable 
“force multiplier” for terrestrial capabilities.”203  Just as resilience expanded regionally 
once states realized that individual resilience could not be achieved through autarky, they 
also recognized that attempts at convergence with the great powers could not be achieved 
without technology and capital transfers from the great powers themselves. 
Technological determinism’s structuralism and domestic space nationalism, then, provide 
insufficient explanation regarding Southeast Asian states’ behavior towards space; rather, 
Southeast Asian space policies are also rooted in global institutionalism and 
constructivist social interactionism, as the international, regional, and domestic levels of 
analysis mutually interact. 
B. INDONESIA 
Indonesia’s extra-regional space cooperation, like all its foreign policy, is 
determined by its geography; its relative security from external threats subordinates 
foreign policy to domestic considerations.
204
 Furthermore, these domestic priorities 
ensure that Indonesian “security is not primarily regarded as a solely…military problem; 
rather, it is seen as a political, economic, and social concern connected to nation- and 
state-building.”205 One contemporary challenge for a democratized Indonesia is 
rebalancing this domestically-driven foreign policy with more “active” engagement.206  
Indonesia’s space program provides an excellent case study of the balancing act between 
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its foreign and domestic agendas, including the persistence of state-supported 
developmental policies amidst democratization.   
LAPAN’s growing budget in the 21st century in a nation already among the 
regional leaders in space technology has roots spread across the archipelago. Unlike 
military modernization, space technologies in Indonesia, where an “all-embracing” 
concept of “national resilience” includes “national identity, national economy, and 
society as well as military capability,” are commonly viewed as both guns and butter.207  
LAPAN, which operates across a broad range of constituencies, likely stands to benefit 
from pork politics more than ever in a democratized Indonesia proliferating with political 
promises. Though not quite a continuation of Sukarno’s autarkic berdikari policies, state-
subsidized, patronage-driven industrial development policies are alive well after 
Suharto’s New Order.208 
Economic recovery and resilience since 1997, culminating in G-20 membership, 
has improved Indonesia’s international image and self-confidence, while its transition to 
democracy has validated the balance of internal forces in a way that allows it to pursue 
the “independent and active” policy it long sought but could not achieve under 
authoritarian rule.209 LAPAN, therefore, represents a dimension of self-strengthening, 
internal balancing by Indonesia, which increasingly seeks to engage the great powers as 
an equal while leveraging its demographics as the world’s largest Muslim country and 
third-largest democracy toward a moderating position between Western and Islamic 
civilizations.210 Elements of national prestige, then, play an increased role in Indonesia’s 
use of LAPAN as an agent for international cooperation. Finally, the military dimensions 
of Indonesia’s aerospace program cannot be ignored, as it seeks cooperative endeavors to 
build domestic capabilities in military industries. While Indonesia’s new Space Law 
reasserts LAPAN’s purely peaceful role, it apparently does not preclude it from 
cooperating with the TNI or foreign countries on endeavors with obvious military 
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applications. Motivations of great power convergence drive such behavior, as Indonesia’s 
aspirations to better control its archipelagic territories and vast maritime domain are 
viewed as prerequisites for equal treatment. Space technologies, therefore, fulfill an 
economic, security, and political niche across a foreign to domestic spectrum. 
Indonesia’s early efforts to build a domestic space architecture began with 
cooperation with the Netherlands on the Tropical Earth Resources Technology Satellite; 
cooperation with its former colonial master reveals both the legacy of imperial ties and 
the importance Indonesia placed on space technologies.211 Alternatively, Indonesia’s 
early cooperation with the United States reflects the early U.S. lead in the international 
satellite market and that Indonesia, while still non-aligned under Suharto’s New Order, 
had grown closer to the Western orbit than the Soviet one. Palapa A-1, B-1, B-2, and B-3 
were launched by the United States after being purchased through commercial contract 
from U.S. companies such as Boeing and Hughes.212 The Palapa telecommunications 
series was coupled with deals for construction of the accompanying control and receiving 
stations and an additional contract to receive remote sensing Landsat signals; the 
receivers’ capabilities were broadened by the mind-1990s to include French SPOT and 
European ERS-1 capabilities in a bid to diversify Indonesia’s remote sensing sources.213  
The United States’ offer to fly an Indonesian astronaut, though aborted, was the last such 
offer that Indonesia accepted.214   
From the beginning, Indonesia sought diversification of its space industry’s 
supply chain. Prior to 1989, China had approached the Indonesian government with an 
offer to help build an $800 million commercial launch pad on Gag Island in cooperation 
with Singapore.215  The project never materialized, as Indonesia’s aspirations to develop 
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its own launch capability would have been undermined by a joint venture and relations 
with China were only normalized in 1989 following a 22-year hiatus after Indonesia 
blamed China for backing the abortive communist coups of the 1960s. But for Indonesia 
to even entertain such a prospect with China in the 1980s “suggests a high degree of 
commitment to developing a space program.”216  
Indonesia’s approach to space cooperation in the 21st century has been 
increasingly balanced with a renewed push for building domestic capabilities. Editorials 
in the Jakarta Globe lay out the argument that reliance on foreign providers today is 
simply a stepping stone to self-reliance in the near future:  the space program’s expense 
in a country with millions below the poverty line and crumbling infrastructure is 
secondary to the “encouraging” symbolic successes that demonstrate what Indonesia is 
capable of “given the right policies and capital.”217  Such proclamations also reflect the 
belief, common to most Southeast Asian states, that space architecture is infrastructure—
an indispensable economic multiplier for a competitive modern economy. The 21st 
century LAPAN-A series beginning with TubSat is representative, as its commercial-
academic cooperative technology transfer (with Germany) facilitated domestic 
construction of the subsequent satellites in the series. 
Indonesia also leverages its broad geography by hosting a telemetry station for the 
Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO).218  It further diversified its suppliers when 
PT Telekomunikasi deviated from U.S. commercial providers in favor of a joint contract 
with Russia’s Reshnetev and French-Italian Thales Alenia Space consortium for its 
Telekom-3 satellite.219  Moltz notes the impact of U.S. ITAR restrictions on influencing 
such changes in the developing world’s satellite market:  in 2009 Indonesia opted for 
Thales Alenia’s more costly bid for its Palapa-D satellite because it could be launched on 
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a cheaper Chinese Long March.220 Problems with orbital insertion by the Chinese booster 
have since incentivized Indonesian companies to again work with a U.S. company to 
construct a telecommunications satellite for launch aboard a European Ariane 5 in 
2016.221 
While Indonesia courts space powers for cooperation, it is courted in return. 
China, Russia, and India have all actively pursued cooperation with Indonesia, largely 
due to its equatorial geography, large population, blossoming space market, and growing 
geopolitical importance. China and India have offered to sell remote sensing data to 
Indonesia, where officials cite the need to “end that reliance” on European-American 
sources.222  ISRO launched LAPAN-A1 from its space center in Sriharikota in 2007, with 
LAPAN-A2 to follow in 2015.223 Indian and Indonesian leadership in 2013, seeking to 
broaden the scope of a 2002 memorandum of understanding, issued a joint statement on 
increased space and defense cooperation, including:  upgrades to the Biak, Papua, ground 
station; Indonesian access to earth data from India’s OceanSat and ResourceSat; 
enhanced training programs for Indonesians at India’s Centre for Space Science 
Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific (CSSTEAP); and more Indian launches of 
Indonesian microsatellites.224 Further afield, Japan and Indonesia collaborated in 2002 on 
research investigating space-based solar power, 225 and Indonesia recently cited safety 
concerns and residents’ protests in declining a long-time Russian offer to construct novel-
technology air-launch facilities in Biak.226 This refusal represented the collapse of six 
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years of hopeful Russian negotiations in which they offered technologies to help 
Indonesia become a “prestigious space nation.”227  Closely tied to the deals’ failure were 
Russia’s obligations under the MTCR, as Indonesia adamantly sought a deal including 
launch technology transfer, for which they ultimately turned to the Chinese. 
Indonesian cooperation with China on space activities dates back to the early 
1990s. In the mid-2000s, it joined nine nations in creating the Asia-Pacific Space 
Cooperation Organization (APSCO), headquartered in Beijing. Due in part to China’s 
heavy hand in APSCO, the Indonesian legislature has yet to ratify the treaty. While 
Indonesia participates in APSCO activities as a signatory nation, it remains an 
organizational outlier. Interestingly, Indonesia’s balanced position allowed LAPAN to 
host an Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) session in light of the 
Japanese-led confederation’s looser, more inclusive model, though it has yet to host an 
annual APSCO summit.228   
Cooperation with China is still significant. China shared with LAPAN 
information from the Shenzhou-9 orbital rendezvous with Tiangong-1, accompanied by 
supportive statements that “Indonesia could replicate China’s success.”229 A Chinese 
taikonaut team toured Indonesia in 2010 to “promote knowledge of Chinese space 
activities, appealing to the country’s large ethnic-Chinese minority.”230  China has also 
offered a manned mission, a goal Indonesia will likely incorporate into LAPAN’s Space 
Law-mandated 25-year plan, indicating some renewed interest in prestige projects.231  
Following ratification of the 2013 Space Law, Indonesia signed a new partnership with 
China on “development of space technology for commercial and peaceful purposes,” 
including hopes that China will be “willing to share a bit of rocket science.”232  Details 
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on the China agreement are still under negotiation, and they include China’s request to 
construct a ground station next to a LAPAN station in Pare-pare, South Sulawesi.233  
Indeed, while space technology cooperation proceeds apace, rocket technology in 
particular is a more sensitive subject, due to its potential to run afoul of the MTCR, 
though neither China nor any Southeast Asian state participate in that regime. Indonesian 
officials specifically cite difficulties in the negotiations arising from China’s trend toward 
heavy-handed approaches and fears of becoming too closely aligned to either side in a 
future Sino-American space arms race.234  Indonesia and China agreed as early as 2007 
to jointly produce guided missiles, including technology transfer and a factory in 
Indonesia, but progress has been slow, partially due to different domestic laws on both 
sides regarding such technology transfers; Indonesia, however, is adamant that such 
transfers are a nonnegotiable part of any deal.235 
As other powers court Indonesia, Agus Hidayat, LAPAN’s cooperation and public 
relations bureau chief, believes the United States is “silently” keeping a “close watch” on 
these proposals.236 The United States has continued to close its cooperation gap with 
Indonesia across a broad front that includes space partnerships:  a 2012 Space 
Cooperation Agreement between the United States and Indonesia facilitates NASA’s 
Southeast Asia Composition, Cloud, Climate Coupling Regional Study (SEAC
4
RS) study 
of Asian emissions’ effects on the monsoon climate.237  Jakarta’s increased international 
advocacy of human rights and democracy complement Washington’s international 
priorities and the Obama administration’s desire to use science and technology for 
Muslim outreach programs. The two democracies have upgraded their Comprehensive 
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Partnership, which lays the groundwork for increased space cooperation among other 
things.238   
In the realm of international space treaties, Indonesia has moved away from its 
part in the odd 1976 Bogota Declaration by developing equatorial states that challenged 
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty’s assertion banning “national appropriation” of anything in 
space.239 It has since ratified the Outer Space Treaty, Rescue Agreement, Liability 
Convention, and Registration Convention, the four primary United Nations treaties 
governing space activities.240 
C. MALAYSIA 
Malaysia’s geography at the nexus of global shipping lanes ties its economy to 
freedom of the seas and cooperation with many nations, a policy it appears to translate 
into the space commons. President Obama’s stop in Malaysia during his 2014 Asia tour 
indicated “recognition of Malaysia as a strategic pivot” in the region, as it was the only 
U.S. non-treaty ally on the agenda.241 As one of the wealthiest countries in Southeast 
Asia, Malaysia seeks to punch above its weight with widely dispersed international 
cooperative projects and an outsized international profile. Historically, Malaysia’s 
postcolonial existence was challenged, so it pursued a developmental path and 
cooperative arrangements that would facilitate its regional security. Rapid growth also 
appeased its multi-ethnic Malay, Chinese, and Indian constituencies, which it sought to 
keep in harmony while improving the relative position of indigenous Malays under the 
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contentious New Economic Policy. Malaysia’s long-time policy since independence, 
accelerated under the longtime leadership of Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, was that foreign 
policy and trade are inseparable from domestic policies.242 Leaders since have only 
sought to enhance foreign policy by providing “depth” through thickening 
relationships.243 Furthermore, the goal of Mahathir’s open economic policy, continued 
under Najib Razak, was “to promote resilience and collective self-reliance among the 
developing” countries in a way that counter-balanced the West; spreading cooperation 
around rather than relying on one partner supports these ends by fostering a more rapid 
convergence in relative standards.244 
Yet while rhetorically practicing an “open policy” of space cooperation, Malaysia 
notably focused that cooperation on more distant space powers such as Russia, Europe, 
and the United States, while minimizing close bilateral space cooperation with China and 
India that may strengthen the economic advantages and external ties of those 
corresponding domestic minorities.245 Change is foreshadowed, however, as leveraging 
space technology as technological bootstraps to lift Malaysia out of the middle-income 
trap is likely to feature in Najib’s New Economic Model launched in 2010.246  This may 
require more truly open cooperative policies (more open to neighbors China and India) as 
Malaysia seeks to leverage the potential of all available partners.  A decreased mandate 
for the Barisan Nasional, which has ruled since independence but is increasingly 
challenged by a viable opposition, may lead to increased democratization or instability 
that either way also alters foreign policy. 
Malaysia’s early satellites Measat-1 and -2 were U.S.-built and launched via 
Ariane rocket.247  Malaysia branched out afterward, looking to build domestic capacity 
by contracting with the United Kingdom’s Surrey Satellite for a joint microsatellite 
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project that was launched in 2000 aboard a Russian Dnepr rocket.248 Work with the 
Russians continued in their 2006 launch of Malaysia’s American-built Measat-3. The 
relationship between Malaysia’s defense and space industries as well as between national 
capabilities and international prestige was indicated by its decision in 2005 to augment its 
Russian Sukhoi-30 fighter jet purchase with the training and launch of its first astronaut 
in 2007.249 It reached out to growing middle-level space powers while continuing to 
build its domestic industry by cooperating on another joint project, RazakSat, with South 
Korea, that also boosted ANGKASA’s international image when equatorial countries 
across three continents expressed interest in RazakSat’s up-to-date, high resolution 
meteorological images.250 Malaysia’s international image was damaged, however, by its 
limited capability to manage the search for missing Malaysia flight MH370 in early 2014; 
it was forced to admit huge lapses in airspace domain awareness as well as reliance on 
external space powers for satellite and other reconnaissance assets. Kuala Lumpur was 
quick to point out, though, that its contributions in remote-sensing satellites, while not up 
to task in searching for MH370 due to resolution restrictions, were on par with the 
contributions of China and most other countries, with the exception of the United States 
and Russia (with their superior reconnaissance satellite technology).251 
Malaysia’s elevation in 2014 to Comprehensive Partnership with the United 
States in conjunction with Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade area negotiations indicates 
close commercial ties.252 Simultaneous attempts to decouple the Malaysian economy 
from overreliance on the United States have not been as successful.  “To compensate for 
the decline in American private investment” that has left Malaysia in economic doldrums, 
“Malaysia is now relying more on strategic alliances through ‘non-economic’ 
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investments in the defense and aerospace industries.”253 Yet again these industries 
feature prominently in state plans for economic growth in the 21st century. 
Malaysia co-hosted an APRSAF session in 2001 and hosted in 2012.254 It has also 
broadened its participation through several cooperative projects with the Japanese 
Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), such as a program soliciting Malaysian 
experiments for parabolic flights simulating microgravity.255 Despite its increased 
international profile with Dr. Mazlan Othman heading UNOOSA for nearly a decade256, 
Malaysia is nonetheless signatory to only the Outer Space Treaty and Rescue Agreement 
and a handful of tangential agreements.257   
D. THAILAND 
Thailand has long utilized its central position on the Asian mainland to focus on 
regional leadership and economic growth by leveraging its space services sector. Its 
relationships further afield have supported this regional-domestic agenda as Thailand 
coordinated extensive international cooperation with domestic efforts to institutionalize 
space technologies within a vibrant economy encompassing academic and commercial 
ventures.258  Thailand balanced early cooperation with the United States with a cozy 
Chinese connection, later adding Japan and other international projects. 
Thailand’s democratic instability in the 20th and 21st centuries has owed much to 
exploitation of foreign policy issues as domestic political weapons, such as the 
Shinawatra family’s sale of Shin Corporation shares to Singapore becoming a pretext for 
the 2006 coup discussed in chapter II.259  Deep socio-political rifts, crystallized around 
the Shinawatra “red shirt” faction’s supposedly populist foreign and domestic policies 
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and the conservative, nationalistic policies of the royalist “yellow shirts,” created 
conditions for another coup in 2014 that leaves questions regarding the consistency of 
Thailand’s future foreign arrangements.260 
Thailand’s early cooperation with NASA on receiving Landsat’s remote-sensing 
data grew out of its close Cold War security relationship with the United States.261 After 
the Vietnam War, Thailand sought to create a regional economic niche by transitioning to 
a space services hub, which has guided many of its policies since and required extensive 
cooperation with extra-regional space powers. Its Lad Krabang distribution hub soon 
leveraged additional French and European data.262  The Thaicom series was produced 
and launched alternately by U.S. and French companies and rockets, including the largest 
geostationary satellite to date, Thaicom-4 or iPStar, produced by Space Systems/Loral, 
which provides broadband across the Asia-Pacific region.263 Thailand has worked 
extensively on technology transfer programs; in addition to its university-based one with 
the UK,264 it is working with the United States and Canada.265 Thailand also tapped 
France for its THEOS satellite construction and training contract, despite attempted 
inroads by China into Thailand’s space industry.266 
Thailand has been willing to tightly link itself to China’s space program since that 
space power’s emergence from the dark ages of the Cultural Revolution. As early as 
1992, Thailand jointly proposed (with China and Pakistan) an Asia-Pacific Workshop on 
Multilateral Cooperation in Space Technology and Applications (AP-MCSTA), which 
included 16 participant nations and a Small Multi-Mission Satellite (SMMS) joint 
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project.267 The SMMS ground receiving station opened at Kasetsart University in 
Bangkok in 2008; construction and joint training was completed by the Chinese Centre 
for Resource Satellite Data and Application (CRESDA) under the auspices of the Chinese 
government.
268
 Thailand was one of the breakout states that formalized their APSCO 
membership in 2005.
269
  Thailand has hosted more APSCO meetings than any other state 
besides China and is an outspoken actor in the organization, also hosting an international 
symposium for Space Cooperation for the Asia-Pacific Region in 2009 and a research 
center for space law, among multiple other projects with an international profile.
270
  
Thailand’s space assets are also part of APSCO’s Asia-Pacific Ground-based Optical 
Satellite Observation System (APOSOS), a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) space tracking 
system intended to provide an alternative to U.S. domination in space object tracking and 
verification.
271
  To not wholly commit itself to Chinese orbit, Thailand also co-hosted 
APRSAF-15 and hosted APRSAF-16 in 2008 and 2010.
272 
 Thailand has only ratified the 
Outer Space Treaty and Rescue Agreement. 
E. VIETNAM 
Vietnam, while like Indonesia seeking a balanced foreign policy of space 
cooperation that supports increased domestic capabilities, nonetheless follows patterns 
much more defined by its historic opposition to China. Amidst the changing geopolitical 
landscape near the end of the Cold War, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) 
adopted the doi moi (renovation) policy in 1986.273  The foreign policy aspect of doi moi 
sought to “diversify” and “multilateralise” external relationships, “especially with major 
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powers and international institutions.”274 Desiring “to create a peaceful external 
environment and facilitate the use of foreign resources, such as capital, markets, and 
technology, for Vietnam’s domestic and economic reform,” Vietnam normalized 
relations in the 1990s not only with its ASEAN neighbors but also with China (1991) and 
the United States (1995).275  To self-strengthen the state, the VCP sought to balance the 
“two aspects of cooperation and struggle in order to develop and protect the economy, to 
defend national security, and to preserve and develop the national cultural traditions and 
characteristics.”276  Le Hong Hiep, in explaining the domestic-foreign policy nexus in 
Vietnam, notes that the authoritarian VCP’s foreign policy lends greater weight to 
domestic political conditions and economic interests; both of these stand to gain from 
boosts to national pride, economic competitiveness, and disaster recovery capability 
supported by the Vietnamese space program.277 A combination of realist space 
nationalism with external cooperation reflects this “struggle-cooperation” strategy’s 
“flexible approach” to Vietnamese security, prosperity, and regime legitimacy in a 
“changing era”278 in which the VCP believes “the strength of a country is measured 
mainly by its economic strength and cultural values.”279 Vietnam’s space policy is 
therefore similar to Indonesia’s in another way:  as a government stimulus project that 
strengthens economic competitiveness, space then pays for more government projects 
(including armaments and more modernization)—a virtuous cycle for the regime. 
Though economic integration with China since Vietnam normalized relations has 
resulted in deeply interdependent supply chains, Vietnam has sought to balance this 
devil’s bargain. Indeed, this proves prudent policy, as 2014 tensions in the South China 
Sea threaten to ripple across regional supply chains.280  Vietnamese success in attracting 
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Western and Japanese investment helps to offset the flood of Chinese consumer goods 
that undermined Vietnam’s domestic economy.281 Because Vietnam cannot hope to 
compete with China alone, close cooperation with Japan and the United States is 
necessary to balance its northern neighbor. Here, Vietnam’s policies of space cooperation 
reflect broader policies. Space development shares a focus on modernization and 
indigenous development within the broader Vietnamese defense industry; Vietnam’s 21st 
century military modernization “has been buttressed not only by arms imports but also 
the development of its own defense industry through co-production and technology 
transfers.”282  Indeed, its move to break its reliance on Thai satellite services through the 
Vinasat-1 launch may have been further motivated by Thailand’s close space cooperation 
with China. Vietnam’s close ties with Japan in space have acted as a backdoor for the 
increased cooperation with Washington desired by Hanoi but deterred by Washington’s 
continued concerns about the VCP’s human rights record. 
Japan has actively supported Vietnamese space ambitions, particularly through 
training programs and official development assistance (ODA) directly from Japan and 
through APRSAF.283  Funding for the VNSC at Hoa Lac Hi-Tech Park is a joint project 
including $400 million in Japanese ODA.284  The ground-breaking was attended by not 
only high-level VCP dignitaries, but also the Japanese Ambassador and representatives 
from the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, JAXA, and NASA, 
indicating its importance in Pacific Rim relations.285 Touted as “one of the biggest 
investment projects in science and technology in Vietnam in… 35 years,” VNSC is also 
hailed as only “the beginning of the strategic cooperation between Vietnam and Japan in 
space technology.”286 The 2013 launch of VAST’s Pico Dragon CubeSat from the 
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Japanese Kibo module aboard ISS (along with several U.S. microsatellites) was the 
second Vietnamese CubeSat to be so launched, following the F-1 microsatellite in 
2012.287 Ground stations at both VNSC and Japanese universities received Pico 
Dragon’s ensuing signals.288 This Japanese national-commercial model of launching 
small satellites from the ISS for other countries may play an increased role throughout 
Southeast Asia in the future, as the market for cheap micro- and nano-satellite explodes, 
benefiting developing states (and secondary schools) on a tight budget. 
Despite little cooperation with Russia since Vietnam’s cosmonaut flight, closer 
cooperation may be on the horizon as Russia realigns its space policies and seeks to 
invigorate its space industry amid a changing geopolitical context. Ninety percent of 
Vietnam’s arms acquisitions since 2002 have been Russian, making it the fifth largest 
consumer of Russian military hardware (behind China, India, Venezuela, and 
Indonesia).289  It also cooperates with Russia on other sensitive technological issues such 
as nuclear power generation and offshore drilling in the South China Sea.290 In 2012 
Vietnam upgraded its strategic partnership with Russia, hinting at increased “strategic 
collaboration,” as Russia talks of including Vietnam in its new Eurasian Economic 
Union.291 Regardless, little in the way of space cooperation has been announced to date. 
When Vietnam finally re-launched its space projects in the 21st century it chose Ariane 
boosters operated by its former colonizer, France, to launch both Vinasats. It has also 
cooperated with the ESA and commercial and academic entities in the United States, 
South Korea, and Malaysia.292 Vietnam hosted APRSAF sessions in 2008 and 2013.293  
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It has ratified the Outer Space Treaty and signed the Rescue Agreement but not the 
Liability or Registration Conventions.294   
Ultimately, VCP governance follows the “successful model of the one-party 
authoritarian state…in Asia, liberal in economic growth but conservative in political and 
social change, insistent on an independent national organizing ideology.”295  The VCP is 
willing to cooperate despite a strong realist perspective, but usually with few strings 
attached and in ways that strengthen the regime’s “performance-based legitimacy.”296  Its 
tensions with China may only drive it closer to Japan and its U.S. patron and invigorate 
its desire to build its own technological-industrial capacity. Concurrently, Japan’s 
constitutional flexing under Shinzo Abe—itself largely in response to China—may 
permit more overt Japanese defense cooperation in the future. Vietnam, however, walks a 
fine line in balancing its relationships with China and the United States. Its space 
cooperation with middle powers such as Japan indicate a compromise position, but may 
eventually pull Vietnam toward one side of an emerging geopolitical rift as the facts on 
the ground change and the VCP becomes entrenched in cooperative security and 
economic agendas favoring one side over the other.   
Kim Ninh’s summary of Vietnam’s balancing situation is revealing:   
[While] not a zero-sum view of security…the elaboration of a 
cooperation-struggle strategy reveals a strong attachment to national 
independence and a perception that even though the current trend is 
toward economic interdependence and cooperation...[this may not] always 
be the case. Power can be utilized in conjunction with cooperation…to 
garner the best possible outcome. It is a view of power and international 
relations from the perspective of a small state, aware of its limitations but 
also determined to maximize its possibilities.297 
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F. SINGAPORE AND THE PHILIPPINES 
Singapore and the Philippines, representing the richest and strongest and one of 
the poorest and weakest states in Southeast Asia, nonetheless share similarities in their 
commercial-academic space program models that lack a unifying space agency to 
coordinate foreign cooperative endeavors. 
Singapore’s constellation of space activities conducted by state-sponsored 
universities and commercial-academic enterprises, while operating substantial 
commercial assets, is reminiscent of Moltz’s description of Australia’s “loose amalgam 
of academic-, private-, and government funded space-related activities, some of which 
were quite sophisticated, but together lacked a sense of integration and national 
vision.”298  As an entrepôt city under single-party rule, Singapore’s government-backed 
commercial space model, which operates a range of commercial contracts spanning half 
the globe, is its foreign policy in space. Though largely ethnically Chinese, Singapore’s 
anti-communist postcolonial history kept it much closer to a Western orbit, reflected 
today in its cooperative space projects. Its first satellite, ST-1, was purchased from 
British-French Matra Marconi and launched via Ariane.299  X-Sat, after being constructed 
at home, was launched from India, and Japan’s Mitsubishi Electric Company was 
selected to construct a much larger communications satellite.300 Singapore also 
outsources to the United States for training large numbers of civilian and military 
personnel in engineering and space operations.301 This last point highlights one of the 
Singapore’s differences with the Philippines:  much of the government backing for its 
commercial-academic model occurs through appreciable interaction with Singapore’s 
modern and active defense ministry. This phenomenon also opens the door to future 
international cooperation in the defense space sector. Singapore hosted APRSAF-18 in 
2011; befitting its internationalist profile, it has ratified or signed all four major space 
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treaties.302 Despite the absence of a singular space authority, Singapore’s small size and 
permeation of government throughout society nonetheless ensure a successful state-
backed space policy. 
The Philippines uses a similar disaggregated bureaucratic model that also relies 
heavily on private commercial endeavors. In the Philippines, “the political system is 
personality-driven, with no institutionalized or program-focused political parties;” rather, 
its national policies are adrift in a sea of “patron-client relationships” and “competition 
among local elites for access to government patronage.”303 Therefore, it is no surprise 
that lucrative contracts for the Philippines’ large domestic telecommunications industry 
and other licenses for foreign technology remain largely in private hands. Private entities 
such as Mabuhay Satellite Corporation operate more than a half dozen 
telecommunications satellites acquired via U.S. corporate contract, purchase of old 
Korean assets, or joint ventures with Indonesian and Chinese companies.304 One of the 
first government activities that did occur under the Philippines’ balkanized national space 
agencies was the use of Landsat and SPOT imagery to fully map the Philippines.305 A 
cooperative remote sensing project with Australia followed shortly.306 Politics continues 
to preoccupy government uses of PAGASA and NAMRIA, such as the 2012 requirement 
to rename the South China Sea the West Philippine Sea on all government maps and 
documents. STCC-COSTA does coordinate activities with NASA and JAXA, but the 
compartmentalized bureaucracy and fiscal constraints limit achievements here, too.307 
The Philippines has substantial incentive to build up its maritime domain 
awareness, to prevent further surprises such as the 1995 Mischief Reef incident or 
standoffs such as Scarborough Shoal in 2012. Its patronage by the United States, with 
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whom it enjoys a mutual defense agreement, counteracts incentives to establish a single 
space agency and build a national space architecture. As long as it can rely on the United 
States to fill gaps in its own capabilities, the Philippines is unlikely to spend the political 
and fiscal capital to develop its own assets. Such external factors are still secondary to the 
political constraints imposed by its fractious domestic politics. Despite these weak state 
space policies, the Philippines has nonetheless signed the major space treaties except the 
Registration Convention, including—uniquely to the region—the globally unpopular 
Moon Treaty.308 
G. MYANMAR, LAOS, CAMBODIA, AND BRUNEI 
Evidence suggests that as developmental levels increase, the LDCs of Myanmar, 
Laos, and Cambodia will increase investments in space technologies, facilitated primarily 
by space policies that grow from larger national domestic and foreign priorities. 
Structural factors such as technological diffusion suggest that, for better or worse, these 
LDCs may be tempted to emulate other regional space policies because the costs of not 
doing so increase as national space assets proliferate.   
Myanmar’s still-dominant Tatmadaw, as it seeks a more balanced foreign policy 
but lacks the capacity for a national space program, would likely pursue an elitist, 
commercialized model similar to the Philippines, because the Tatmadaw is still heavily 
involved in the economy. Once the wealthiest country in the region, Myanmar is likely to 
look around and see other countries leveraging space technology to build internal 
capacity and balancing capability. Because Myanmar’s junta seeks to balance China’s 
outsized influence, it is likely to remain supportive of Japanese overtures for space 
cooperation so that it can get its foot on the first rung of the space ladder and not be left 
too far behind. Japan’s quick work to make inroads in Myanmar to balance China’s 
traditional influence is a win-win for both the Japanese and Burmese. Shortly after 
forgiving billions in Burmese debt, Japan held workshops with Myanmar on using 
satellite technology to bolster its telecommunications and information sectors and provide 
                                                 
308 “International Agreements,” UNOOSA.  
 73 
small-scale earth survey satellites for a variety of uses, while helping Myanmar craft a 
space strategy and training personnel at Japanese universities.309  
Laos, with its strong communist authoritarianism, and near-Finlandized Cambodia 
enjoy close ties with China; to that end, most space applications launched from those 
countries in the near future, such as Laosat-1, are likely to be heavily subsidized by the 
Chinese as Beijing seeks to tighten the ties that constrain those governments’ foreign 
policy options.310 Indeed, in 2013 a state-sanctioned group from Cambodia visited the 
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation to discuss a future Cambodia 
Satellite-1 to support that country’s rapidly growing telecommunications industry.311 
Brunei hosts an Indian ground station.312 
H. CONCLUSION 
Like the substantial arms acquisition and modernization programs throughout the 
region (even by countries without sensationalized territorial disputes),313 some 
combination of domestic and external factors must have motivated the concurrent 
increases in space budgets. Economic growth alone is insufficient to explain such 
policies, while the requirement for capital and technological support means foreign policy 
implications must be justifiably balanced against domestic priorities. Overall, historic 
alignments, such as Vietnam with the Soviets or Thailand with the United States, have 
shifted with the global order as new forces—more economic and geostrategic than 
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ideological—increase in relative importance.314 Democratic Thailand has shifted toward 
China, while communist Vietnam has moved toward democratic Japan. Indonesia and 
Malaysia balance multiple extra-regional space partnerships in pursuit of independent 
foreign policies, though the domestic origins of such policies differ. The Burmese junta 
reopened its border and loosened its authoritarian autarky partially to avoid Chinese 
domination and appears likely to follow policies similar to other regional states in the 
future. Laos and Cambodia so far lack the state power to attempt the same. Offshore 
balancers such as the United States remain appealing despite China’s heavy gravitational 
pull on the region’s economic and security paradigms. 
What does this all mean vis-à-vis Southeast Asian space programs and policies?  
Southeast Asian states seek to leverage multiple cooperative arrangements to facilitate 
technology transfer and domestic capacity-building in a way that facilitates internal 
balancing, economic growth, and convergence with existing space powers. Doing so not 
only protects their postcolonial independence but strengthens their domestic legitimacy. 
Regardless of government type, Southeast Asian domestic incentives regarding space 
technology drive thematically similar space foreign policies. 
Southeast Asian states seek to balance their cooperative arrangements with 
foreign powers to maintain domestic stability and regional independence; where their 
neighbors perceive insufficient balancing they seek to counterbalance. For example, if 
Vietnam sees Thailand moving too close to China, it will adjust its own external 
balancing toward Japan in response. While this maintains balance in the short term, it 
emphasizes the importance of domestic policies in maintaining regional balance—
regional action-reaction responses absent internal controls could result in two opposing 
spheres of influence, one China-led and the other based around a U.S.-Japanese 
confederation. Not only would this undermine the international cooperative regime in 
space, but such a divide in space cooperation would likely lock the space sector into a 
broader geopolitical rift. Ironically, Southeast Asian states would find their foreign 
policies constrained after all as they align on opposite sides of a Pacific Rim space race. 
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The “missing middle” to maintaining stability is regional cooperation within Southeast 
Asia.315 As Southeast Asia seeks to build an ASEAN Community, there is room for a 
regional cooperative space architecture that touches upon all three pillars. 
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IV. COOPERATION AMONG SOUTHEAST ASIAN SPACE 
PROGRAMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II revealed domestic motives for space investments in Southeast Asia.  
Chapter III discussed the interaction between domestic and foreign policies in influencing 
extra-regional space cooperation. This chapter discusses space cooperation among 
Southeast Asian countries, particularly within the ASEAN framework. The previous two 
chapters’ focus on space nationalism, technological determinism, and divergent external 
alignments indicate a host of centrifugal forces working within the regional space sector, 
but these are partially counteracted by a variety of centripetal forces working toward 
regional cooperation and integration. While space cooperation among Southeast Asian 
states is constrained by competitive motives, external alignments, and resource scarcity, 
ASEAN member states nonetheless pursue modest regional space cooperation 
characterized by moves toward bureaucratic (and, to a lesser extent, epistemic) space 
S&T communities that fit within the integrative ASEAN agenda. 
Though this space cooperation is more rhetorical than substantive, it is important 
because it reflects a broader hedging strategy that seeks to limit the influence of the large 
blocs tugging at the region. If the security of ASEAN member states is even partially 
interdependent, those states are more vulnerable to larger powers so long as intramural 
competition outweighs cooperation; to some degree, they must cooperate with each other 
to balance larger powers and maintain regional stability. Thus, techno-national jockeying, 
as most nations seek to expand their competitive advantages, results in a net positive 
experience for the regional space S&T sector as broader regional capacity is achieved. 
The role national and regional elites play in supporting a cosmopolitan bureaucratic 
agenda in the face of substantial popular disinterest and the persistence of primordial 
nationalism is also relevant to the pursuit of such shared regional interests, as the balance 
between those two competing forces will influence ASEAN’s collective ability to 
leverage those individual national achievements. 
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Underlying these various regional forces is a changing international paradigm as 
the current space arena is transformed by a blooming number of participants. Past 
assumptions regarding space relationships, developed in a period of limited actors, are 
shifting as “space… is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.”316  
To such perspectives should also be added “cooperative.”317 Concentrating on the first 
three characteristics and neglecting the fourth, as many small countries enter space 
amidst cooperative political architectures and resource constraints that preclude unbridled 
competition, reflects how states in the 21st century space age have “grappled with how to 
incorporate the realm of space into their understanding and interpretation of territoriality, 
international law, and national security.”318 Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions offers a perspective of scientific progress as a “kind of punctuated 
equilibrium,” with predominantly slow evolution interrupted by environmental 
disruptions that provoke a “paradigm crisis” in which there is “no longer a basis for 
comparability between previously held notions of reality and current developments.”319 
Perhaps the trajectory of international space cooperation, across its various levels of 
interaction, is crossing such an event horizon. If so, a theory of space interaction that 
sheds light on the complex relationships among Southeast Asian nations on this 
technological frontier must not only be firmly rooted in earthly concepts of international 
relations developed over the history of human experience, but also integrate novel 
phenomena that uniquely color the condition of the modern world system.320 As such, the 
earlier chapters’ emphasis on space nationalism and technological determinism—which 
revealed the connections between cooperative and competitive behaviors—can now be 
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more fully augmented by global institutionalist and social interactionist insights in a more 
holistic understanding of Southeast Asian space motives and relationships. 
B. OVERLAPPING INTERNATIONAL ARENAS FOR COOPERATION 
Chapter III already revealed a number of fora hosted by space powers, including 
APSCO and APRSAF, which include a number of Southeast Asian nations. Chapter III 
also notes that half of ASEAN member states have hosted an APRSAF; with the loosest 
structure of the multiple organizations, it is also the most inclusive.321 Another is the UN-
affiliated CSSTEAP, regionally headquartered in India, which includes Indonesia, 
Thailand, Myanmar, and Malaysia. CSSTEAP’s goals include creation of an “integrated 
programme of space applications for regional development,” so that “no country in the 
region will have to look abroad for expertise in space science and technology 
application.”322 The membership rolls of APSCO, APRSAF, and CSSTEAP overlap but 
are not all-inclusive within Southeast Asia and also indicate competing visions of Asian 
space leadership by great powers in which Southeast Asian regional interests are likely to 
remain secondary. Also important, then, are regional efforts to replicate or complement 
these larger international efforts. 
C. ASEAN SPACE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION 
1. The ASEAN Community as Context 
Southeast Asian states’ rapid growth over the last few decades has been matched 
by substantial growth in their ties to the global economy. At the same time, following its 
expansion after the Cold War, ASEAN’s early focus on its security environment has 
diminished relative to finding common socioeconomic ground among its constituents to 
hedge against the persistent influence of great powers. Complementing their small-state 
views of security as encompassing both national and regional resilience across a broad 
range of political, economic, and social aspects, the ASEAN states have broadened 
ASEAN’s mandate to include establishment of an ASEAN Community built on three 
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pillars that reflect these dimensions:  the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 
(ASCC).   
The APSC officially “promotes political development in adherence to the 
principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, and respect for…human 
rights and fundamental freedoms” while seeking to ensure that “the peoples and member 
states of ASEAN live in peace with one another and with the world at large.”323 To this 
end ASEAN has expanded membership in its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia that acts as a “code of conduct of inter-state relations,” established an 
ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation to foster conflict resolution, adopted the 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, and sought to further practical security cooperation 
through proposals by the annual ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM).324 
Among the most successful programs is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which has 
been an important international effort in security cooperation across the Asia-Pacific 
region for over twenty years. Yet, a litany of ongoing issues challenge the efficacy of 
these efforts. To date, ASEAN has proved ineffective in conclusively mediating a number 
of border disputes and transnational issues such as piracy and human trafficking. 
Functional democracy and respect for human rights are certainly not universally 
appreciated throughout the region. The APSC clearly illustrates gaps between ASEAN 
rhetoric and reality. 
The AEC’s goal has been phased “regional economic integration” by 2015, 
including a “single market and production base, competitive economic region, equitable 
economic development, [and] integration into the global economy.” The AEC has 
established a series of successive benchmarks that have moved all ten member states—
though at different paces—toward that end. While some of the AEC Blueprint’s metrics 
are ambiguous, unclear, or behind timeline, real achievements have been made. By April 
2013, 78% of the AEC’s Blueprint measures had already been implemented, regional 
                                                 




annual per capita income had increased from $2267 to $3759, and total ASEAN trade had 
grown 16.8% from 2010 to 2011 to exceed $2.4 trillion.325 Of that last amount, intra-
ASEAN trade had increased 23% to nearly $600 billion.326 Tariff rates on nearly 100% 
of items in ASEAN’s Common Effective Preferential Tariff scheme have been near zero 
in the ASEAN-6 (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, The Philippines, and Brunei) 
since 2010, with the CMLV (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam) nations’ tariffs 
down to less than a 2% average by 2012 (from 8% in 2000) on nearly 70% of items.327 
Aside from broadening transportation infrastructure, ASEAN has established the ASEAN 
Single Window System to allow single-entry of traded goods into a region-wide 
accountability system, begun establishment of the ASEAN Single Aviation Market, and 
implemented Mutual Recognition Arrangements for several professions.328 ASEAN has 
signed five major international free trade agreements (FTA) since 2000.329 Yet progress 
has been slow on implementing even key enabling mechanisms necessary to meet the 
2015 deadline. For example, visa-free travel between member states has still not been 
fully implemented, and significant economic protections remain in place, particularly in 
some of the countries with large domestic markets to protect (Indonesia and the 
Philippines). 
Multiple critiques contend that ASEAN makes “process, not progress,”330 citing 
an annual litany of issues not satisfactorily addressed over the previous year and the 
“creeping, hesitant economic integration” as ASEAN’s primary (overrated) 
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achievement.331 Though not wholly unjustified in their frustration, such views fail to 
acknowledge the real achievements over the organization’s lifetime, including greater 
internal and regional stability, several instances of collective bargaining with extra-
regional powers (such as the FTAs), and substantial integration of regional supply 
chains.332 Such criticisms neglect to acknowledge that shortcomings in meeting the often 
ambitious timelines merely indicate a work in progress rather than failure or regression. 
Regardless of its magnitude, the vector toward integration has maintained consistent 
direction. Underlying divergent viewpoints on whether ASEAN is “powerful” are 
competing realist and constructivist perceptions that “draw different empirically-based 
conclusions about ASEAN’s efficacy.”333 Realists consider ASEAN a talk shop 
“peripheral to great power politicking,” and would cite the disconnect between regional 
space cooperation and national space agendas as evidence.334 Social interactionism offers 
a different context in which power is not always negative-sum and identity-building 
through iterative interaction builds new consensual norms that allow collective action on 
specific issues.335 Thus, to focus on the APSC’s and AEC’s tempered successes at the 
expense of the equally relevant but more intangible third pillar, the ASCC, is a mistake. 
2. Building Bureaucratic and Epistemic Communities  
Despite its nebulous nature, the ASCC is particularly relevant to the discussion of 
regional space programs as the creation of stronger regional scientific bureaucracies, 
epistemic communities, and public excitement regarding space investments is one way in 
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which these diverse nations can construct a regional identity.336 The ASCC Blueprint 
seeks to “forge a common identity” to “bring out the human dimension of ASEAN 
cooperation” and “lift the quality of life for its people,” providing strategic direction in 
areas concerning human development, environmental sustainability, narrowing the 
development gap, disaster resilience, and education.337 It is important to note that, in the 
ASEAN Annual Report, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Science and Technology 
(AMMST) is listed under the AEC section due to its recognizable applicability to 
economics, though it could also be considered relevant to numerous ASCC functions 
such as the ASEAN Education Ministers’ Meeting, ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 
Disaster Management, ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment, Conference on 
the Parties to the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, ASEAN 
Ministers’ Meeting on Rural Development and Poverty Eradication, and ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting on Social Welfare and Development, among others.338   
a. Building Bureaucratic Communities:  COST and SCOSA 
ASEAN’s founding Bangkok Declaration referenced S&T cooperation among its 
motivations in 1967, establishing the ASEAN Committee on Science and Technology 
(COST) in 1978.339 Since inception, COST’s focus has remained on strengthening 
ASEAN’s S&T organizational structure rather than actual joint projects.340 Meanwhile, a 
substantial portion of COST’s funding has been historically sourced from dialogue 
partners rather than from within ASEAN itself.341   
Like the rest of ASEAN, COST’s agenda has changed and grown with the 
organization itself. Its millennium plan of action includes the following goals:   
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a. to intensify cooperation on science and technology development and 
R&D between the public and private sector that has a strong thematic 
focus and is interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral; 
b. to expand [the] scope of regional programmes leveraging on national 
experiences and resources and ASEAN-help-ASEAN initiatives that will 
enable the newer ASEAN members to move up the learning curve and 
become economically competitive; 
c. to establish a highly mobile and intelligent S&T community that thrives 
on knowledge creation and application, and is creative; 
d. to create a system of rewards and incentives in order to encourage 
innovation and technology commercialization and attract talent to a life-
long career in science and technology; i.e., to ascertain a means of seeding 
and sustaining science and technology programmes through innovative 
ways of investing in S&T endeavors and generating revenue; and 
e. to enhance a system of management of the future S&T enterprise that is 
innovative, bold and entrepreneurial.342  
COST’s mission now covers functional areas including public and private cooperation, 
commercial development, wealth distribution, education, and community-building. 
Of COST’s ten program areas, two—Meteorology and Geophysics (SCMG) as 
well as Space Technology and Applications—are overtly relevant to space.343 Others 
with secondary relevance to space technologies include the Sub-Committee on Marine 
Science (SCMS) and the Sub-Committee on S&T Infrastructure and Resources 
Development (SCIRD) which operates the ASEAN Experts Group on Remote Sensing 
(AEGRS).344 Working groups under the ASEAN Senior Officials on Environment 
(ASOEN) and the Committee on Culture and Information (COCI) have also overseen 
activities involving space technologies.345   
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The organizational disunity among these various institutions may be more a result 
of space’s utility across a broad range of fields than institutional failure to create an 
overarching space activities framework. Within COST, the Sub-Committee on Space 
Technology and Applications (SCOSA) meets twice a year and is funded collaboratively 
(though not equally) by ASEAN member states and dialogue partners.346 Its cooperative 
regional agenda includes the following:   
 Formulate and coordinate collaborative and cooperative programmes and 
projects on space technology and its applications, in particular, remote 
sensing, satellite meteorology, communication and satellite technology 
applications for environmental and natural resource management, and 
development planning; 
 Review the status and capability of space technology in the region and 
promote this technology for natural resource and environment 
management and sustainable development; 
 Recommend mechanisms to involve government agencies, industries and 
academe in promoting and sustaining regional cooperation in space 
technology and its applications; 
 Exchange information on national policies, programmes and planning in 
all areas of space technology and its applications among member 
countries; 
 Facilitate and accelerate the transfer of space technology and its 
applications to the ASEAN region; 
 Promote collaborative activities and projects on space technology and its 
applications with relevant international organizations; 
 Advise COST on matters relating to space technology and its applications. 
 Assist in securing financial support and seek funding sources for ASEAN 
activities and projects relating to space technology and its applications.347 
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SCOSA is largely a vehicle for bringing cooperative enterprises together across 
industrial, academic, bureaucratic, and international lines in pursuit of knowledge sharing 
and technology transfer. 
SCOSA’s grand ambitions remain resource-constrained and its practical 
achievements have been relatively subdued. Many projects remain pending or on-going 
through substantial delays. SCOSA has, however, brought ASEAN member states 
together in working on several satellite application training workshops and a few earth 
observation programs.348 Such cooperation goes back to utilization of the early 
Indonesian Palapa telecommunications satellite series by (then) ASEAN members 
Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.349 Priority Integration Sectors (PIS) 
led by specific countries have included using remote sensing to monitor rubber 
(Thailand) and rice (Vietnam) production, for supporting cultural and eco-tourism 
(Cambodia), and for influenza prevention and response (Indonesia).350 By 2011, SCOSA 
was handling 11 projects, though only two were ongoing with the remainder pending or 
proposed, in the fields of biodiversity, disaster management, land cover and climate 
change, and an ASEAN Earth Observation Satellite (ASEAN-EOS).351 Though a 2013 
Thailand-led workshop to reassess the feasibility of an ASEAN-EOS determined that 
“development of ASEAN-EOS may not be achievable at the moment,” the meeting 
agreed to “exhaust other options that can equally address the objectives of ASEAN-
EOS,” such as the integration of a “virtual constellation of the existing satellites among 
ASEAN member states.”352 Building a virtual constellation would provide valuable and 
ongoing collaborative experience and represent substantial progress in bureaucratic 
cooperation. Another of SCOSA’s projects, dating back to 1991, was the 2001 release of 
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ASEAN from Space, a collaborative collection of satellite remote sensing imagery of the 
region, compiled from regional and international sources and published by GISTDA. 
While circulation was limited to 2000 copies, such a compilation of regional views from 
outer space can uniquely provoke collective identification, as Apollo 8’s “Earthrise” 
photograph did for humanity and the environmental movement in 1968.353 A second 
volume is planned. 
Notably, many of SCOSA’s achievements occur through ASEAN cooperation 
with extra-regional partners.354 SCOSA has cooperated with China and India on remote 
sensing, JAXA and the Asia Institute of Technology on disaster monitoring, and the EU 
on ASEAN uses of the Galileo navigation system, among others.355 In 2012, the ARF 
hosted a Space Security Workshop in Vietnam, whose conclusions described the 
importance of “stronger regional and broader international cooperation…to enhance the 
security, safety, and sustainability of space” and that “there should be a continuing role 
for the ARF on space issues.”356 Also in 2012, India hosted the heads of all of Southeast 
Asia’s space agencies in Bangalore, facilitated by the active involvement of the ASEAN 
Secretariat. This meeting was notable as a multi-scalar opportunity for regional, 
multilateral, in bilateral coordination among member states’ space programs and ISRO; 
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its areas of focus included greater cooperation on satellite ground stations and personnel 
training, among other topics.357 Outside the narrower purview of SCOSA, cooperative 
projects on S&T among multiple institutions are still dominated by extra-regional 
cooperation, and certainly activities in supporting shared S&T objectives have been 
limited. Events such as the ASEAN-EU and ASEAN-China Years of Science and 
Technology Cooperation (2012) and annual ASEAN Science and Technology Weeks do 
not even specifically highlight space awareness.358 Extra-regional cooperation is based 
on the realities of finite resources at ASEAN’s disposal, though the choice to cooperate 
through ASEAN at all is an example of a conceptual perception of ASEAN as a medium 
for cooperation that collectively amplifies individual interests. The success of these 
examples and SCOSA’s stated goal of facilitating technology transfer to and through the 
entire region means such events are likely to continue in the future.   
In 2012, the AMMST revealed plans to restructure COST and its subcommittees 
in the future to design more “appropriate clusters,” though plans have been delayed 
pending further studies on optimal reorganization.359 Additionally, the AMMST 
acknowledged that the 80 percent of earnings from the ASEAN Science Fund (ASF) 
were insufficient to support most S&T activities, and proposed establishing an 
augmentary ASEAN Innovation Fund (AInF) and partnering more actively with dialogue 
partners.360 Such changes could result in more collaborative efforts within certain sectors 
such as space that are currently relevant to a number of disaggregated fields and 
subcommittees and thus potentially suffer from bureaucratic stove-piping.   
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b. Building Bureaucratic Communities: Proposals for a Regional Space 
Program  
ASEAN romantics who often tout the EU as a model for regional integration 
(despite substantial differences in conditions and motives) similarly tout ESA as a 
functional model for an ASEAN Space Organization (ASO) that would both benefit—
and benefit from—greater ASEAN unity.361 In such proposals, a more robust regional 
space architecture would unify the national space programs of member states under a 
single space policy to pool resources as a “necessary scheme” toward building a stronger 
ASEAN Community.362 One refrain is that an ASO would “assure equal rights to space 
benefits,” so that returns are not limited to the “first beneficiary” but will “spread out to 
other cooperating countries equally” in line with the references to fair distribution of 
benefits in the UN space treaties.363 Notable in such ambition is the equal importance 
placed on the ASO’s ability “to serve as a focal point for broader international 
cooperation for the exploration and utilization of outer space.”364 Not to be outdone, 
other proposals include merging APSCO and APRSAF into an Asian space agency that 
would also include the Southeast Asian space programs.365 Aside from the unrealistic 
expectations of such continental ambitions, the inclusion of large space powers in such an 
organization would diminish the stature of ASEAN and its constituents and therefore be 
undesirable for a region of smaller states.   
Parallel attempts by a 2012 working group to establish a road map toward an 
African Space Agency are conceptually relevant to the proposals that include Southeast 
Asia. The champions of an African Space Agency posit that developing regional space 
agencies could follow the ESA example to benefit from increased competition, synergy, 
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industrial development and capacity building. Detractors counter that many of these same 
achievements can be better accomplished by “strengthening nascent national space 
programmes, fostering intra-regional competition, and raising the profile of space 
activities in…national and regional political structures.”366 Important to note are the two 
viewpoints’ divergent perspectives on the relative value of cooperation and competition 
in motivating and financing developing country achievements in outer space. As we have 
seen in previous chapters, many increased investments in space programs in the last 
decade have indeed been incentivized by (peaceful) techno-national rivalry, with 
SCOSA’s activities as a smaller complement. This competition-cooperation duality is 
important as both play a role in facilitating Southeast Asian advancements in space; it 
prioritizes national interests but facilitates regional cooperation in areas of shared interest.   
Of more practical interest than a true regional space organization are proposals for 
more frequent and inclusive project-based committees that seek to leverage overlapping 
priorities of the various Asian organizations within the “regional space regime complex” 
(APRSAF, APSCO, CSSTEAP, and ASEAN, etc.) as “building blocks” for consolidating 
space governance.367 Such a scheme would essentially constitute business as usual, with 
interested partners choosing to partner where interested. These multi-scalar constructs 
allow states to leverage project-specific advantages appropriately. For example, 
APSCO’s broad geography (stretching from Turkey to Peru) has been useful in working 
toward a “unified space observation network based on optical trackers” for which global 
reach is advantageous; it has been less useful for satellite slot-sharing schemes as single 
slots are rarely useful for more than a few partners.368 In contrast, ASEAN’s tightly 
clustered, equatorial geography has already been useful for virtual slot-sharing schemes, 
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insofar as transnational purchases of commercialized data from regionally-oriented 
satellites can be considered sharing of a single space asset.   
Other newsworthy ASEAN issues potentially benefitting from space applications 
include environmental issues and domain awareness. While disaster prevention and 
response is a key motivation for many a space investment, most projects, such as 
Indonesia’s Sahadev or Vietnam’s VNREDSat, have been national or received interest as 
multilateral projects for the larger Asia-Pacific region.369 In 1997, the Singapore Straits 
Times published a series of color satellite images for the first time that escalated cross-
border tensions by facilitating finger-pointing at Indonesia for the annual transboundary 
haze problem. Yet, additional photos since, particularly in 2014, have revealed fires in 
Malaysian Borneo, and many of the companies responsible for swidden land-clearing are 
active across national borders. Multilateral solutions in the future are likely to include 
some measure of satellite verification. Similar problems of land use and pollution 
throughout the Mekong basin could also benefit. Regarding domain awareness, maritime 
registry efforts using satellite-enabled technologies could facilitate increased awareness 
with attendant effects on territorial disputes, piracy, and human trafficking. The above 
issues highlight, however, the sub-regional nature of many of ASEAN’s international 
issues, which are particularly split between mainland and maritime clusters. The nature of 
these issues suggests that investments in specific space assets to address them will likely 
reflect the sub-regional nature of the problem.370  
Given the salience of techno-national security motives for the various Southeast 
Asian space programs and the sub-regional nature of ASEAN’s most pressing issues, it 
seems unlikely that a robust collaborative space architecture will emerge in the near 
future, although space investments—some of them cooperative—will increase. While 
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cooperation will continue, so will national rivalry; however, the relatively peaceful nature 
of competition due to the subordination of security interests within a broader 
developmental paradigm implies that both ASEAN and its individual member states will 
benefit from the increased technological and economic capacity such cooperative 
competition spurs. Furthermore, there is a role for ASEAN’s COST-SCOSA to operate as 
an added ambassador for international S&T cooperation that provides a stronger 
collective posture from which to arrange cooperative international projects. 
c. Building Epistemic Communities 
In assessing the status and prospects for S&T development in Southeast Asia, 
Roger Posadas concludes that the techno-national strategies of Southeast Asian states to 
converge with great powers must now operate “amidst the challenges and opportunities 
of technoglobalism,” which is characterized by:  (1) the internationalization of R&D and 
scientific communities; (2) the “integration of technological complementarities through 
strategic alliances”; and (3) “the international diffusion of technologies at much earlier 
stages of the life-cycle.”371 In light of such findings, he recommends that ASEAN 
increase its competitiveness through pursuit of “technoregionalism,” which would build 
regional resilience better than through individual techno-national strategies.372 A 2001 
RAND study of S&T collaboration between countries with different levels of scientific 
capacity emphasizes the importance of technology transfer and also suggests that existing 
gaps in such collaboration are extremely detrimental toward shrinking the development 
gap.373 ASEAN states, therefore, while continuing to maximize the benefits of 
technology transfer from developed countries, would also be well served by 
complementing these schemes with more effective cooperation with each other in space 
S&T, to reduce individual investments in duplicative efforts and to unlock regional 
synergies. Importantly, such regional cooperation would result in expansion of the 
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ASEAN space S&T epistemic community, as relevant personnel and sectors increased 
not only dialogue but also practical cooperation. This exchange would benefit the 
region’s space S&T sector as technologies transferred from outside were forwarded 
throughout the region’s interconnected economies, and it would also support construction 
of the broader ASCC by standardizing a regional cadre of scientific bureaucrats and elites 
and thickening backward linkages to other relevant sectors. 
Ernst Haas et al. explored the role of S&T epistemic communities, suggesting that 
scientists within international organizations play an increasingly important role in 
transforming cognitive mindsets from purely competitive nationalism toward a better 
leveraging of specialized knowledge to address socioeconomic development and political 
problems.374 It is within such a framework that the ASCC can complement the AEC and 
APSC. Currently, despite decades of achievements, one of ASEAN’s challenges is its 
lack of regional identity. ASEAN is often accused of being too ambitious, elitist, and 
“lacking [in] serious efforts to solicit public opinion.”375 In one 2008 survey, only 60.7% 
of even elite university students were familiar with ASEAN; among the general populace, 
awareness is doubtless much lower.376 Many cite “low educational levels, economic 
disparities, differences in political and legal systems, and uneven information technology 
acquisition as major obstacles for an ASEAN Community initiative,” yet these issues are 
precisely what could be addressed through the cooperative process of building regional 
virtual constellations to knit together the developmental aims of the various national 
space programs.377   
Currently, many technicians and engineers within ASEAN’s space industries must 
still be educated overseas; though international university partnerships seek to address 
this, the underfunding of public education throughout the region (outside Singapore) will 
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continue to stymie such efforts. Regardless, an increasing number of universities in 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and elsewhere are engaging in collaborative space S&T 
projects with foreign universities as well as teaching curricula in English (the working 
language of ASEAN), establishing media for a common academe. Other national 
attempts to engage the ASEAN public in the S&T fields are augmented by nascent 
region-wide efforts supported by the ASCC and AEC, as technology use within society is 
increasingly associated with higher standards of living.378  In one example of knowledge-
sharing, in 2009 LAPAN launched an online aerospace library, billed the largest of its 
kind in ASEAN, in an effort to incite greater public interest and tap into the broader 
ASEAN community (particularly those disadvantaged by location) to LAPAN’s own 
advantage.379 
Haas also points out that the technical agendas of broad socioeconomic 
development compete with national priorities of “maintaining social stability and 
traditional values” due to the former’s potential disruption of the latter.380 Furthermore, 
the persistence of “national pride…achieved by dint of efforts to develop an indigenous 
scientific elite and technological capability” counteracts the professed goal of regional 
equality in a way that “delay[s] the optimization of aggregate economic growth.381 This 
phenomenon is certainly at work among ASEAN’s member states, where cooperative 
rhetoric does not wholly subsume the space nationalism apparent in attempts to broaden 
sectorial competitive advantages that result in some regional duplications of effort at 
great expense. These competing priorities indicate that ASEAN is most likely in the near 
future to, at best, sustain suboptimal “incremental growth” as it adapts to meet new 
challenges, rather than reassess its values so that it operates under a more positive-sum 
regime of “managed interdependence.”382 SCOSA (indeed, ASEAN) is unlikely to be 
                                                 
378 “Greater Technology Use Linked to Higher Per Capita Income,” Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, Pew 
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adopted soon as an end in itself, rather than simply a means to achieve national ends.383  
The result should be tempered expectations. ASEAN’s primary reaction to major 
“ideational challenges” has been “localization,” in which imported ideas of 
institutionalism are reconstructed to better match the local identity, and “inertia,” which 
is “most likely if domestic conditions facilitate resistance” to “transformation.”384 It is 
usually such transformation, the “construction of a new collective identity” that is 
required to counter new challenges.385 The challenge for the idea of greater ASEAN 
space cooperation, then, is to better balance the strong techno-national perceptions of 
space S&T’s utility with increased appreciation of its own value. SCOSA, within the 
lager ASEAN Community-building agenda, has provided a foundation upon which to 
build a regional space architecture, but has yet to substantively bridge the independent 
national space programs. ASEAN space cooperation will likely plod ahead, and even 
receive greater attention, but it will remain a much smaller priority than national prestige 
projects in the near future.   
At the same time, “there is powerful evidence that the subordination of science to 
cultural diversity is a thing of the past.”386 The very similarity of Southeast Asia’s 
scientific bureaucracies despite vast socio-cultural differences within the region is 
evidence of a prevailing consensus on the value of modernization and the role of space 
investments as a means to that end. Acceptance of this creed among scientific 
practitioners and some elites indicates that there will likely be a growing regional 
epistemic community that subscribes to such values and that the space community is an 
exciting growth field within the larger ASEAN Community. 
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D. IMPLICATIONS OF REGIONAL SPACE COOPERATION 
ASEAN’s cooperative behavior on space S&T supports the perception of ASEAN 
as an instrument of “hedging utility.”387 Viewing ASEAN space cooperation and national 
space programs in this light “captures the sovereignty-centered and power-sensitive 
dimensions of ASEAN behavior quite well without ignoring the cooperative 
achievements of the grouping” that favor a “rather shallow multilateralism characterized 
by contingent, flexible, low-cost, thematically broad and only moderately accountable 
institutions” such as COST and SCOSA.388 Just as with economic integration, 
achievements by individual member states as they compete for comparative advantage is 
likely to have numerous positive-sum effects, as long as they are at least tied together by 
even the loose architecture of SCOSA (and APRSAF), to say nothing of their collective 
partnerships with other extra-regional space powers.389 As individual space capabilities 
are built, the capacity for meaningful cooperation increases accordingly.   
One distinct revelation in ASEAN’s space cooperation patterns is that the lines of 
interaction are not neat:  rather, there exists an overlapping, multi-scalar network of 
iterative interactions. While space programs may have their origins in domestic politics, 
they connect nations, epistemic communities, and organizations in an ever-thickening 
web of relationships. These networks can not only facilitate increased opportunities to 
modularly pool resources for cooperation between interested parties, but also structurally 
define the boundaries of responsible behavior in space, as new norms are established and 
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the numbers of stakeholders increased. Global institutionalist and social interactionist 
theories thus lend credence to softer theories of technological determinism, in which the 
effects of new technologies are less influential in structurally constraining society than 
the human element is in guiding how technology is utilized. Therefore, previous 
dynamics of international interaction regarding the space environment are fundamentally 
changed as a global majority enters space. As more nations crowd into orbit, previous 
monopolies on capabilities are eroded and undesirable unilateral actions can be met by a 
louder chorus of stakeholders:  Goliaths begin to look like Gullivers, still giant but 
vulnerable to entrapment by collective action. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Chapter IV has shown that even though space cooperation among Southeast Asian 
states is constrained by competitive motives, external alignments, and resource 
constraints, notable opportunities for regional space cooperation exist. One important 
result of such cooperation is the growth of bureaucratic and epistemic communities amid 
an ever-thickening web of international cooperation across multiple levels. In light of 
competitive motives that build capacity discussed in earlier chapters, this reveals that 
cooperation and competition are not mutually exclusive; rather, they are two sides of the 
same coin in the currency of international statecraft. To a large degree, both competitive 
and cooperative agendas complement—rather than contradict—each other in a positive-
sum game, in which a quorum of regional actors is made better off due to the 
substantially peaceful nature of the process. Even so, the sub-regional nature of interests 
and the influence of external space powers is notably salient, so while such positive-sum 
interaction may be beneficial in the near future, if emerging divisions are not sufficiently 








The data indicate increasing expenditures by Southeast Asian countries in 
developing space capabilities and building national space bureaucracies. Given the 
longevity of existing investments and their symbolic importance in a developing region, 
such trends seem likely to be sustained in the future. This thesis described the conditions 
under which ASEAN member states choose to invest national resources in space 
programs as vehicles for cooperation and competition with each other and within the 
international system. 
Chapter I emphasized the importance of national space programs as a component 
of national security and development policies due to dual-use perceptions and broad 
range of applications across a number of sectors. The chapter also provided a regional 
context in which to analyze Southeast Asian space developments based on schools of 
thought built on theories of international relations:  space nationalism (realism), 
technological determinism (structural realism), global institutionalism, and social 
interactionism.   
Chapter II examined national space programs, including domestic motivations for 
space investments. Realist principles of space nationalism and the structural influences of 
technological determinism helped identify that Southeast Asian space investments are 
viewed as a techno-national means of building national resilience. The small postcolonial 
states of Southeast Asia seem driven by an imperative to work toward convergence with 
developed nations to reduce their vulnerability amid a shared consensus (with 
constructivist elements) that space technology is an indispensable socioeconomic 
multiplier in the modern global economy. Critics who challenge the expense of space 
investments in developing countries fail to appreciate the utility with which such 
programs are viewed (measured in more than just dollars); for most Southeast Asian 
states, climbing the space ladder is an essential means of internal balancing. Furthermore, 
while the focus is predominantly on peaceful applications of space technology for 
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socioeconomic development, broad perceptions of national power aggregation ensure that 
security considerations are certainly present. 
Chapter III explained domestic forces driving foreign policy regarding Southeast 
Asian states’ partnerships with extra-regional space powers. External sources of finance 
and technical capacity remain indispensable for Southeast Asian countries emerging 
space programs due to the complexities of space technologies and the relative lack of 
local capacity. While space powers actively court Southeast Asian states for space 
cooperation, to a large degree reception to such partnerships are determined by states’ 
priorities. Additionally, Southeast Asian states are pulled in different directions by their 
competing space policies and domestic priorities, such that external balancing plays a 
large role in who states choose to partner with. While nearly all Southeast Asian states 
seek to maintain an independent balance among foreign providers of space services, a 
seam is forming between mainland and maritime states due to different priorities within 
the larger geopolitical context. While such rifts are certainly not exclusive to space 
cooperation, again, it is an indicative field, and the degree to which such rifts are allowed 
to open may add to strong centrifugal forces pulling against the ASEAN community-
building agenda. 
While realist perspectives of competition dominate the first two chapters, chapter 
IV’s insights of global institutionalism and social interactionism reveal how incentives 
toward cooperation work to balance the competitive side of the equation describing 
Southeast Asian space programs. Despite economic competition within the region and 
disparate external alignments, ASEAN’s member states can also cooperate with each 
other in order to collectively hedge against the influence of large global power blocs. A 
broad agenda for identity-building within the ASEAN Community and the very real 
“security complex” within the region ensure that some centripetal forces continue to 
oppose the centrifugal ones at work. Therefore, while states use their space programs to 
build their own independent space capabilities and competitive advantages, the result is 
largely a positive-sum game that enhances regional resilience. Against the backdrop of 
official bureaucratic community-building, the role of elites in setting an international, 
cosmopolitan agenda contributes toward building a regional S&T epistemic community 
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that has a real chance to evolve and benefit a stronger regional identity in the future. 
Nonetheless, these centripetal forces are still weak compared to centrifugal forces of 
techno-nationalism and external alignments, though increasing human capital and an 
integrated economy will build greater S&T capacity for regionally-sourced joint projects 
in the future. 
In summary, security considerations for space development in Southeast Asia are 
present as elsewhere, just subordinated within a developmental agenda (chapter II). 
ASEAN member states balance their cooperative endeavors in space technologies among 
a number of space powers and offshore balancers based on domestic perceptions of 
security and independence (chapter III). A nascent regional space S&T community could 
provide a vehicle for ASEAN cooperation in the future, particularly through identity-
building within an international epistemic community (chapter IV). Cooperative and 
competitive forces among these smaller states actually complement each other within a 
multi-scalar international network, perhaps uniquely when compared to the strong 
competitive forces that characterize the great powers in space. Patterns of space 
cooperation and competition among Southeast Asian space programs balance these two 
activities, as well as regional centrifugal and centripetal forces, in a relatively peaceful, 
positive-sum game for national and regional space development.   
B. LOOKING AHEAD 
The cross-domain functions of space technologies and the geopolitical dynamism 
of Southeast Asia make the region’s space programs a useful weathervane to indicate 
active vectors within the world system. Technological diffusion and policies of national 
empowerment indicate a wealthier future with increased actors in a multi-scalar, 
multipolar world with an increasingly interconnected economic and security complex. 
Enhanced national capabilities indicated by space savviness could increase the potential 
for conflict, as more connections mean more potential for a rupture that cascades through 
the complex system. However, space also offers unique opportunities for cooperation, as 
an increasing number of international stakeholders are confronted by the challenges of 
the unique physics, fragile environment, and expensive barriers to entry of the 
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increasingly crowded commons of the final frontier. Within ASEAN, increased capacity 
is likely to facilitate increased regional cooperation, though this will likely begin first 
with sub-regional bilateral and multilateral breakout groups cooperating on specific 
projects before spreading to formalized organizational efforts. 
Within the global international arena, along the lines of their Zone of Freedom, 
Peace, and Neutrality and Nuclear Weapons Free Zone the small states of Southeast Asia 
are likely to oppose any weaponization of space that threatens their increased reliance on 
space-based technologies. Those space investments represent an even larger relative 
expense within their more limited budgets, and they are acutely conscious of their 
inability to compete with space powers seeking to actively establish or undermine space 
control through greater militarization of space. Southeast Asian states will likely continue 
to support policies of space sanctuary and equitable access to space-derived benefits in 
the future. 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
Southeast Asian states will continue to require extra-regional partnerships for 
space S&T development well into the future, creating opportunities for the U.S. as a 
potential market and a high-profile avenue for international outreach to a strategically 
important region. While China is an indispensable nation in Southeast Asia, the region is 
hungry for offshore balancers, and the United States commands a premium lead in the 
space sector. Prospective partnerships should be explored and exploited.   
Regarding space, the United States must avoid focusing on only key players while 
missing the growing chessboard of actors, all of whom play a specific role in the game. 
The United States should engage not only longtime strategic partners, but the region 
collectively, so that rifts do not develop within the region that threaten to unravel the 
currently peaceful “security complex.” Assistance in developing an ASEAN-EOS or 
similar virtual constellation is one such opportunity. Additionally, the example of 
Vietnam demonstrates the value of Japan as a back door to regional cooperation in areas 
in which it may otherwise be limited.   
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The peaceful prescriptions of the region’s space programs open opportunities for 
cooperation on developmentally-relevant projects. Technical assistance and space 
technology transfer can facilitate development of epistemic communities that build 
human capital and enhance regional development in a larger positive-sum exchange. The 
relative political innocuousness of scientific communities provides an opportunity to 
consistently maintain open channels to international elites despite political developments 
that may preclude greater official cooperation and assistance. Isaac Asimov wrote, 
“Never let your sense of morals prevent you from doing what is right.”390 The United 
States must not trip over its own sense of justice nor succumb too eagerly to space 
protectionism in an increasingly interconnected international paradigm of its own 
making. The United States should maintain its commitment to removing most 
commercial satellite technologies from ITAR restrictions in the future in order to 
reestablish and maintain its market dominance in this sector.391 It must remain 
consistently open and not retreat behind such protectionist walls again. In the vein of 
technological determinist arguments, the United States should not let fear of technology’s 
worst potential uses drive state policy; rather, technology should be socially constructed 
as a tool (for soft power and otherwise) to achieve national policies.   
Due to small states’ unique perceptions of power, they can often be more prone to 
cooperate through international institutions because they provide an opportunity for a 
louder collective voice. As the international regime in space changes due to a dramatic 
increase in national stakeholders, the United States should work to maintain a favorable 
global institutional regime from a position of leadership. Withdrawal from and failure to 
ratify key treaties due to notions of self-interested exceptionalism are counter-productive 
in the current international order and noted by states of all sizes. Finally, the increasingly 
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“crowded orbits”392 of LEO are a uniquely fragile commons. Space control rhetoric 
aside, the United States cannot control everything that accesses outer space; as an 
increasing number of national players enter space and cheap, small, disposable satellites 
penetrate the market, efforts to register and mitigate space debris must be at the forefront 
of national policy. Active engagement with an active region in an active sector is 
paramount. 
                                                 
392 Moltz, Crowded Orbits. 
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